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Miami-Dade Noise Ordinance CITY OF MIAMI BEACH CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE Inter-Office Memorandum to - Date: April 4, 2005 From: Chief Special Master Robert Newman Robert Parcher, City C)e:k('t/\,k. Robert T. Datorre L ~~ ~ Assistant City Attorney \ Subject: City of Miami Beach Enforcement of Miami-Dade County Noise Ordinance To: Attached, please find a copy of the Order Granting the City of Miami Beach's Motion for Final Summary Judgment in DA Mortgage, Inc., et. al. v. City of Miami Beach, et. aI., S.D. Fla. Case 03- 20684-CIV -MARTINEZ. As you will recall, late last year, the Court entered an order rejecting the Plaintiffs' argument that the Miami - Dade County Noise Ordinance (~21- 28, Miami -Dade County Code) was unconstitutional. In this Final Judgment, Judge Jose E. Martinez has upheld portions of Chapter 30 of the City Code which grant the City's Special Masters authority to hear and rule on violations of the Miami-Dade County Noise Ordinance. Accordingly, the Court has ruled in favor of the City and County on all counts in the suit filed by DA Mortgage, Inc. and 136 Collins Ave., L.C. (Opium Garden). Any arguments raised by persons or entities cited under Miami-Dade County ~21-28 pertaining to the arguments dismissed in this order should accordingly also be rejected by the City's Special Masters and no continuances should be granted based on these claims. (.O") <:::) --'i 01 :.:U .......~ -::~;.... --- -'(J rn -::0 () rr~ I ;c -..J rn ....... ....."... (.0 :J:lI' < -", -- rn (CJ CD -q 0 -n 0 n l'T1 UNJTED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA Miami Division FILED by D.C. Case Number: 03-20684-CIV-MARTINEZ-KLEIN MAR3 1 2005 DA MORTGAGE, INC., and 136 COLLINS AVENUE, L.c., CL"'''ENCE MADDOX CLERK U. S. DIST. .CT. S.D. OF FL..... "'I~I Plaintiffs, CLOSED CIVD.. CASE vs. CITY OF MIAMI BEACH and MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, Defendants. I ORDER GRANTING THE CITY OF MIAMI BEACH'S MOTION FOR FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant City of Miami Beach's Motion for Final Summary Judgment (D.E. No. 53), filed on March 30. 2004. The Court heard oral argument on July 26,2004. For the reasons stated more fully herein, the motion is granted. T. Background Plaintiff DA Mortgage, Inc. ("DA Mortgage"), is a Florida corporation that currently holds a lease to real property located at 136 Collins Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida. Plaintiff 136 Collins Avenue, L.c. ("136 Collins") is a Florida corporation that has a sublease with DA M011gage and operates a nightclub on the premises. Defendant Miami-Dade County (the "County") is a chatter county established pursuant to the Florida Constitution. Defendant City of Miami Beach (the "City") is a municipality organized and existing under the laws and constitution of the State of Florida and located in Miami-Dade County. 1 * b The City has issued several Notices of Violation to 136 Collins for failure to comply with ~ 21-28(b) of the Miami-Dade County Code ("County Code"), which prohibits excessive noise. Pursuant to ~~ 162.03 and 162.22, Florida Statutes (2004), the City has enacted an "alternate code enforcement system," which grants jurisdiction and authorizes the city's special masters to hold hearings and impose fines, liens, and other non-criminal penalties for violations of the Miami Beach City Code ("City Code") or the County Code. The Notices of Violation issued to 136 Collins were scheduled for hearing before one of the city's special masters. DA Mortgage and 136 Collins have filed a nine-count Complaint against the City and the County. As an initial matter, because DA Mortgage has never been issued any notices of violation by the City or County, DA Mortgage has not suffered an "injury in fact" and consequently lacks standing to bring any of the claims alleged in the Complaint. Koziara v. City of Casselberry, 392 F.3d 1302,1304-1305 (11th Cir. 2004). Tn addition, as to the claims against the County, alleged in Count II and Count III of the Complaint, this Court has already entered surrunary judgment in favor of the County and held the County's noise ordinance is constitutional. (D.E No. 82). Thus, this order adjudicates all remaining claims, which are brought by 136 Collins against the City. II. Standard Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion for summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to intenogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facl and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The United States Supreme Court has stated: 2 In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates entry ofswmnary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Ce/otex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322 (1986); Everett v. Napper, 833 F2d ] 507, 1510 (I lth Cir. 1987). The Supreme Court has further stated that "Rule 56(c) therefore requires a non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits 01" by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Ce/otex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 324. An issue of fact is "genuine" ifthe record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Uberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248; Matsushita Electric indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S 574, 586 (1986). It is "material" ifit might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law. Anderson. 477 U,S. at 248. III. Analysis Count I alleges S ~ 46-151, 46-152, and 46-153 of the City Code, the City's noise ordinance, arc unconstitutional. However, the City has not issued any notices of violation to 136 CoBins for failure to comply with the City's noise ordinance; rather, the City has issued Notices of Violation for failure to comply with the County Code. Thus, the aBeged injUl)' of 136 CoBins is not "fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant," and consequently, 136 Collins lacks standing to bring the claim alleged in Count l. Koziara, 392 F.3dat 1304-1305.1 Thus, the 1136 Collins concedes this point. (D.E. No. 58 at 3). 3 City is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw as to Count 1. 2 Count IV alleges ~~ 30-1 and 30-2 of the City Code violate ~g 162.03 and 162.22, Florida Statutes. Section 162.03 provides a "charter county, a noncharter county, or a municipality may, by ordinance, adopt an alternate code enforcement system which gives. . . special masters. . . the authority to hold hearings and assess fines against violators of the respective county or municipal codes and ordinances." Section 162.22 provides the "governing body of a municipality may designate the enforcement methods and penalties to be imposed for the violation of ordinances adopted by the municipality." In 9 9 30-1 and 30-2 of the City Code, the City has implemented a special master system Specifically, 9 30-1 of the City Code provides the "city code enforcement special masters shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide cases in which violations are alleged of any provision of the city's or county's codes or ordinances." Section 30-2 of the City code states the "city creates, pursuant to F.S. ch. 162, an alternate code enforcement system that gives special masters. . . the authority to hold hearings and impose fines, liens and other noncriminal penalties against violators of the city's or county's codes and ordinances." Nevertheless, 136 Collins contends that, under g~ 162.03 and 162.22, the City special master is prohibited from adjudicating violations of County ordinances which have not been formally adopted by the City. Compl., ~ 30. 136 Collins' claim is without merit. Miami-Dade County is a chaner county established pursuant to Article VIII, Section l(g) of the Florida Constitution, which provides charters 2COUJlt II alleged ~ 21-2B(b) of the COUllty Code, which is the County's noise ordinance. is unconstituLional. This Court has already entered summary judgment in favor ofUle County and held 9 21-28(b) is constitutional. (D.E. No. 82). To the extent Count HI alleges 136 Collins is entitled to damages based on Counll, the CiLy is also entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw as to Count IlJ. 4 counties "shall have all powers of local self-government not inconsistent with general law, or with special law approved by vote of the electors. The governing body ofa county operating under a chalter may enact county ordinances not inconsistent with general law. The charter shall provide which shall prevail in the event of a conflict between any county and municipal ordinances." In addition, Article VIII, Section 6(t) ofthe Florida Constitution provides Miami-Dade County with a specific grant of power over municipalities located within the county. The Miami-Dade County Chal1er provides that "each municipality shall have the authority to exercise all powers relating to its local affairs not inconsistent with this Charter. Each municipality may provide for higher standards of zoning, service, and regulation." 9 5.02, Miami- Dade County Charter. In addition, the Supremacy Clause of the Miami-Dade County Charter provides the Charter '<and ordinances adopted thereunder shall in cases of conflict supersede an municipal charters and ordinances, except as herein provided." ~ 8.04(a), Miami-Dade County Charter. Thus, the noise ordinance is in force in the City, because the City must provide its citizens with the minimum standards for zoning, service, and regulation, as provided in the County Code. Chapter 8CC of the County Code contains the code enforcement procedures for the County. Pursuant to g 8CC-1 I(e) of the County Code, the City may enforce the minimum standards provided in the County Code pursuant to the County's code enforcement procedures or pursuant to the City's lawful and authorized code enforcement system. By implementing a special master system pursuant to ** 162.03 and 162.22, Florida Statutes. the City has chosen to enforce the provisions of the County Code through a lawful and authorized code enforcement system. Therefore, to the extent 136 Collins alleges the City is without authority to lawfully 5 enforce the County's noise ordinance without first adopting it and thereby giving the citizens of the City notice that the County's noise ordinance will be enforced in the City, its arguments fail. The City is authorized to enforce the minimum standards provided in the Miami-Dade County Code, including PI-28(b) of the County Code. Sections 30-1 and 30-2 of the City Code implement a special master system pursuant to ~* 162.03 and 162.22, FIOIida Statutes through which the City may enforce provisions of the County Code and the City Code. In addition, *~ 30-1 and 30-2 ofthe City Code dearly state that the city's code enforcement special masters shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide cases in which violations are alleged of any provision of the city's or county's codes or ordinances. This gives notice to citizens of the City that the County's noise ordinance will be enforced in the City through the special master system. Accordingly, judgment will be entered in favor ofthe City and against 136 Collins on Count IV. Count V is a declaratory action pursuant to 42 U. S. C. * 1983 for alleged violations of 136 Collins' Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, because 99 30-' and 30-2 of the City Code are vague and overbroad. To the extent the allegations of Count V relate to Count IV, the Court finds Count V fails, because, as discussed supra, the City can enforce applicable provisions of the County Code through the City's special master system. To the extent Count V relates to 136 Collins' allegations that ~ 21-28(b) of the County Code is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, the Court finds Count V fails, because this Court has already entered summary judgment in favor of the County and held the County's noise ordinance is constitutional. (D.E. No. 82). Accordingly, judgment will be entered in favor of the City and against 136 Collins on Count V Count VI alleges 136 Collins is entitled to damages pursuant to 42 U.S.c. g 1983 6 resulting ITom the City's enforcement of ~9 30-1 and 30-2 of the City Code. To the extent the allegations of Count VI relate to Count IV, the Court finds Count VI fails, because, as discussed supra, the City can enforce applicable provisions of the Miami-Dade County Code through the City's special master system. Accordingly, judgment will be entered in favor of the City and against 136 Collins on Count V Count VII alleges that 930-75(5) ofthe City Code violates Article II, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution. Specifically, 136 Collins aJleges that because the City's special master may issue orders having "force oflaw" and command "whatever steps are necessary" to assure compliance, ~30-75(5) violates the separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches ofgovemment. CompI.,' 42. However, ~ 30-75(5) of the City Code was enacted as a provision similar to * 162.08, Florida Statutes, and Florida courts have upheld powers provided by Chapter 162, Florida Statutes, to code enforcement boards, because the powers did not cross the line between "quasi-judicial" and 'judicial." Michael D. Jones, P.A. v. Seminole County, 670 So.2d 95 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). In addition, in Verdi v. Metro Dade County, the Florida Third District Court of Appeal held Metropolitan Dade County's code enforcement procedures, established pursuant to Chapter 162, Florida Statutes, were "quasi- judicial rather than judicial in nature and that the County's use of hearing officers in these proceedings is constitutionally authorized." 684 So. 2d 870, 873-874 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1996). Therefore, the Coult finds *30-75(5) ofthe City Code is not an unconstitutional grant of judicial power to the City's special masters. See KMS Restaurant Corp. V. Wendy's 1m '/. Inc., 361 F.3d 132 I, 1325 (holding that where Florida substantive law governs. the federal courts must either follow the decision of the Florida Supreme Coun, or follow the decisions of Florida's 7 " intermediate appellate courts, absent a compelling indication the Florida Supreme Court would rule otherwise). Accordingly, the City is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw as to Count VB. Count VIIl is an action for declaratory relief against the City pursuant to 42 U.S.c. ~ 1983 to have *~ 30-36 and 30-37 declared a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 136 Collins voluntarily dismissed Count VIII at the oral argument on July 26, 2004. Because Count IX alleges 136 Collins is entitled to damages based on the claim in Count VIII, this count will also be dismissed. It is hereby: ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant, City of Miami Beach's Motion for Final Surrnnary Judgment (D.E. No. 53) is GRANTED. Summary Final Judgment be and the same is hereby ENTERED in favor of the City of Miami Beach against 136 Collins Ave., L.c. 136 Collins Ave., L.c. SHALL take nothing by this action, and the City of Miami Beach SHALL go hence without day. All pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT, and this case is CLOSED. DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, thi; I day of March, 2005. Copies provided to: Magistrate Judge Klein All Counsel of Record 8