LTC 551-2018 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change SpeciMIAMI BEACH
OFFICE OF THE CITY MANAGER
NO. LTC# LETTER TO COMMISSION
551-2018
TO: Mayor Dan Gelber and Members
FROM: Jimmy L. Morales, City Manager
DATE: October 12, 2018
SUBJECT: The Intergovernmental Panel on C mate Change Special Report
I would like to share a recent report to help inform policy discussions and decisions
about climate change mitigation and adaptation. The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) recently released a special report on the impacts of global
warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas
emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of
climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty.
The press release and a special summary for policy makers are attached. The full report
and official resources are located at: http://ipcc.ch/report/sr15 .
If you have any questions, please contact the City's Assistant City Manager/Chief
Resilience Officer Susanne M. Torriente.
Thank you for your continued support.
Attachment 1: Press Release
Attachment 2: Summary for Policymakers
JLM/SMT/AK
IPCC Secretariat
c/o WMO · 7 bis, Avenue de la Paix · C.P: 2300 · CH-1211 Geneva 2 · Switzerland
telephone +41 22 730 8208 / 54 / 84 · fax +41 22 730 8025 / 13 · email IPCC -Sec@wmo.int · www.ipcc.ch
2018/24/PR
IPCC PRESS RELEASE
8 October 2018
Summary for Policymakers of IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5ºC approved by
governments
INCHEON, Republic of Korea, 8 Oct - Limiting global warming to 1.5ºC would require rapid, far-
reaching and unprecedented changes in all aspects of society, the IPCC said in a new assessment.
With clear benefits to people and natural ecosystems, limiting global warming to 1.5ºC compared to
2ºC could go hand in hand with ensuring a more sustainable and equitable society, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) said on Monday.
The Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5ºC was approved by the IPCC on Saturday in Incheon,
Republic of Korea. It will be a key scientific input into the Katowice Climate Change Conference in
Poland in December, when governments review the Paris Agreement to tackle climate change.
“With more than 6,000 scientific references cited and the dedicated contribution of thousands of
expert and government reviewers worldwide, this important report testifies to the breadth and policy
relevance of the IPCC,” said Hoesung Lee, Chair of the IPCC.
Ninety-one authors and review editors from 40 countries prepared the IPCC report in response to
an invitation from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) when it
adopted the Paris Agreement in 2015.
The report’s full name is Global Warming of 1.5°C, an IPCC special report on the impacts of global
warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways,
in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable
development, and efforts to eradicate poverty.
“One of the key messages that comes out very strongly from this report is that we are already
seeing the consequences of 1°C of global warming through more extreme weather, rising sea levels
and diminishing Arctic sea ice, among other changes,” said Panmao Zhai, Co-Chair of IPCC
Working Group I.
The report highlights a number of climate change impacts that could be avoided by limiting global
warming to 1.5ºC compared to 2ºC, or more. For instance, by 2100, global sea level rise would be
10 cm lower with global warming of 1.5°C compared with 2°C. The likelihood of an Arctic Ocean
free of sea ice in summer would be once per century with global warming of 1.5°C, compared with
at least once per decade with 2°C. Coral reefs would decline by 70-90 percent with global warming
of 1.5°C, whereas virtually all (> 99 percent) would be lost with 2ºC.
“Every extra bit of warming matters, especially since warming of 1.5ºC or higher increases the risk
associated with long-lasting or irreversible changes, such as the loss of some ecosystems,” said
Hans-Otto Pörtner, Co-Chair of IPCC Working Group II.
Limiting global warming would also give people and ecosystems more room to adapt and remain
below relevant risk thresholds, added Pörtner. The report also examines pathways available to limit
warming to 1.5ºC, what it would take to achieve them and what the consequences could be.
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“The good news is that some of the kinds of actions that would be needed to limit global warming to
1.5ºC are already underway around the world, but they would need to accelerate,” said Valerie
Masson-Delmotte, Co-Chair of Working Group I.
The report finds that limiting global warming to 1.5°C would require “rapid and far -reaching”
transitions in land, energy, industry, buildings, transport, and cities. Global net human-caused
emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) would need to fall by about 45 percent from 2010 levels by 2030,
reaching ‘net zero’ around 2050. This means that any remaining emissions would need to be
balanced by removing CO2 from the air.
“Limiting warming to 1.5ºC is possible within the laws of chemistry and physics but doing so would
require unprecedented changes,” said Jim Skea, Co-Chair of IPCC Working Group III.
Allowing the global temperature to temporarily exceed or ‘overshoot’ 1.5ºC would mean a greater
reliance on techniques that remove CO2 from the air to return global temperature to below 1.5ºC by
2100. The effectiveness of such techniques are unproven at large scale and some may carry
significant risks for sustainable development, the report notes.
“Limiting global warming to 1.5°C compared with 2°C would reduce challenging impacts on
ecosystems, human health and well-being, making it easier to achieve the United Nations
Sustainable Development Goals,” said Priyardarshi Shukla, Co-Chair of IPCC Working Group III.
The decisions we make today are critical in ensuring a safe and sustainable world for everyone,
both now and in the future, said Debra Roberts, Co-Chair of IPCC Working Group II.
“This report gives policymakers and practitioners the information they need to make decisions that
tackle climate change while considering local context and people’s needs. The next few years are
probably the most important in our history,” she said.
The IPCC is the leading world body f or assessing the science related to climate change, its impacts
and potential future risks, and possible response options.
The report was prepared under the scientific leadership of all three IPCC working groups. Working
Group I assesses the physical science basis of climate change; Working Group II addresses
impacts, adaptation and vulnerability; and Working Group III deals with the mitigation of climate
change.
The Paris Agreement adopted by 195 nations at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC
in December 2015 included the aim of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate
change by “holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-
industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial
levels.”
As part of the decision to adopt the Paris Agreement, the IPCC was invited to produce, in 2018, a
Special Report on global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global
greenhouse gas emission pathways. The IPCC accepted the invitation, adding that the Special
Report would look at these issues in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat
of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty.
Global Warming of 1.5ºC is the first in a series of Special Reports to be produced in the IPCC’s
Sixth Assessment Cycle. Next year the IPCC will release the Special Report on the Ocean and
Cryosphere in a Changing Climate, and Climate Change and Land, which looks at how climate
change affects land use.
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The Summary for Policymakers (SPM) presents the key findings of the Special Report, based on the
assessment of the available scientific, technical and socio-economic literature relevant to global warming
of 1.5°C.
The Summary for Policymakers of the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5ºC (SR15) is
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/report/sr15/ or www.ipcc.ch.
Key statistics of the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5ºC
91 authors from 44 citizenships and 40 countries of residence
- 14 Coordinating Lead Authors (CLAs)
- 60 Lead authors (LAs)
- 17 Review Editors (REs)
133 Contributing authors (CAs)
Over 6,000 cited references
A total of 42,001 expert and government review comments
(First Order Draft 12,895; Second Order Draft 25,476; Final Government Draft: 3,630)
For more information, contact:
IPCC Press Office, Email: ipcc-media@wmo.int
Werani Zabula +41 79 108 3157 or Nina Peeva +41 79 516 7068
Follow IPCC on Facebook, Twitter , LinkedIn and Instagram
Notes for editors
The Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 ºC , known as SR15, is being prepared in response to
an invitation from the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change in December 2015, when they reached the Paris Agreement, and
will inform the Talanoa Dialogue at the 24th Conference of the Parties (COP24). The Talanoa
Dialogue will take stock of the collective efforts of Parties in relation to progress towards the long -
term goal of the Paris Agreement, and to inform the preparation of nationally determined
contributions. Details of the report, including the approved outline, can be found on the report page.
The report was prepared under the joint scientific leadership of all three IPCC Working Groups, with
support from the Working Group I Technical Support Unit.
What is the IPCC?
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is the UN body for assessing the science
related to climate change. It was established by the United Nations Environment Programme (UN
Environment) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in 1988 to provide policymakers
with regular scientific assessments concerning climate change, its implications and potential future
risks, as well as to put forward adaptation and mitigation strategies. It has 195 member states.
IPCC assessments provide governments, at all levels, with scientific information that they can use to
develop climate policies. IPCC assessments are a key input into the international negotiations to
tackle climate change. IPCC reports are drafted and reviewed in several stages, thus g uaranteeing
objectivity and transparency.
The IPCC assesses the thousands of scientific papers published each year to tell policymakers
what we know and don't know about the risks related to climate change. The IPCC identifies where
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there is agreement in the scientific community, where there are differences of opinion, and where
further research is needed. It does not conduct its own research.
To produce its reports, the IPCC mobilizes hundreds of scientists. These scientists and officials are
drawn from diverse backgrounds. Only a dozen permanent staff work in the IPCC's Secretariat.
The IPCC has three working groups: Working Group I, dealing with the physical science basis of
climate change; Working Group II, dealing with impacts, adaptation and vulnerability; and Working
Group III, dealing with the mitigation of climate change. It also has a Task Force on National
Greenhouse Gas Inventories that develops methodologies for measuring emissions and removals.
IPCC Assessment Reports consist of contributions from each of the three working groups and a
Synthesis Report. Special Reports undertake an assessment of cross-disciplinary issues that span
more than one working group and are shorter and more focused than the main assessments.
Sixth Assessment Cycle
At its 41st Session in February 2015, the IPCC decided to produce a Sixth Assessment Report
(AR6). At its 42nd Session in October 2015 it elected a new Bureau that would oversee the work on
this report and Special Reports to be produced in the assessment cycle. At its 43rd Session in April
2016, it decided to produce three Special Reports, a Methodology Report and AR6.
The Methodology Report to refine the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas
Inventories will be delivered in 2019. Besides Global Warming of 1.5ºC, the IPCC will finalize two
further special reports in 2019: the Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing
Climate and Climate Change and Land: an IPCC special report on climate change, desertification,
land degradation, sustainable land management, food security, and greenhouse gas fluxes in
terrestrial ecosystems. The AR6 Synthesis Report will be finalized in the first half of 2022, following
the three working group contributions to AR6 in 2021.
For more information, including links to the IPCC reports, go to: www.ipcc.ch
GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 °C
an IPCC special report on the impacts of global
warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and
related global greenhouse gas emission pathways,
in the context of strengthening the global response
to the threat of climate change, sustainable
development, and efforts to eradicate poverty
Summary for Policymakers
This Summary for Policymakers was formally approved at the
First Joint Session of Working Groups I, II and III of the IPCC
and accepted by the 48th Session of the IPCC, Incheon,
Republic of Korea, 6 October 2018.
SUBJECT TO COPY EDIT
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SPM-1 Total pages: 33
Summary for Policymakers
Drafting Authors: Myles Allen (UK), Mustafa Babiker (Sudan), Yang Chen (China), Heleen de
Coninck (Netherlands), Sarah Connors (UK), Renée van Diemen (Netherlands), Opha Pauline Dube
(Botswana), Kris Ebi (USA), Francois Engelbrecht (South Africa), Marion Ferrat (UK/France),
James Ford (UK), Piers Forster (UK), Sabine Fuss (Germany), Tania Guillen (Germany/Nicaragua),
Jordan Harold (UK), Ove Hoegh-Guldberg (Australia), Jean-Charles Hourcade (France), Daniel
Huppmann (Austria), Daniela Jacob (Germany), Kejun Jiang (China), Tom Gabriel Johansen
(Norway), Mikiko Kainuma (Japan), Kiane de Kleijne (Netherlands), Elmar Kriegler (Germany),
Debora Ley (Guatemala/Mexico), Diana Liverman (USA), Natalie Mahowald (USA), Valérie
Masson-Delmotte (France), Robin Matthews (UK), Reinhard Melcher (Austria), Richard Millar
(UK), Katja Mintenbeck (Germany), Angela Morelli (Norway/Italy), Wilfran Moufouma-Okia
(France/Congo), Luis Mundaca (Sweden/Chile), Maike Nicolai (Germany), Chukwumerije Okereke
(UK/Nigeria), Minal Pathak (India), Anthony Payne (UK), Roz Pidcock (UK), Anna Pirani (Italy),
Elvira Poloczanska (UK/Australia), Hans-Otto Pörtner (Germany), Aromar Revi (India), Keywan
Riahi (Austria), Debra C. Roberts (South Africa), Joeri Rogelj (Austria/Belgium), Joyashree Roy
(India), Sonia Seneviratne (Switzerland), Priyadarshi R.Shukla (India), James Skea (UK), Raphael
Slade (UK), Drew Shindell (USA), Chandni Singh (India), William Solecki (USA), Linda Steg
(Netherlands), Michael Taylor (Jamaica), Petra Tschakert (Australia/Austria), Henri Waisman
(France), Rachel Warren (UK), Panmao Zhai (China), Kirsten Zickfeld (Canada)
Acknowledgements
We are very grateful for the expertise, rigour and dedication shown throughout by the volunteer
Coordinating Lead Authors and Lead Authors, with important help by the many Contributing
Authors. Working across scientific disciplines in each chapter of the Special Report on Global
Warming of 1.5°C. The Review Editors have played a critical role in assisting the author teams and
ensuring the integrity of the review process. We express our sincere appreciation to all the expert
and government reviewers. A special thanks goes to the Chapter Scientists of this report who went
above and beyond what was expected of them: Neville Ellis, Tania Guillén Bolaños, Daniel
Huppmann, Kiane de Kleijne, Richard Millar and Chandni Singh.
We would also like to thank the three IPCC Vice-Chairs Ko Barrett, Thelma Krug, and Youba
Sokona as well as the members of the WGI, WGII and WGIII Bureaus for their assistance,
guidance, and wisdom throughout the preparation of the report: Amjad Abdulla, Edvin Aldrian,
Carlo Carraro, Diriba Korecha Dadi, Fatima Driouech, Andreas Fischlin, Gregory Flato, Jan
Fuglestvedt, Mark Howden, Nagmeldin G. E. Mahmoud, Carlos Mendez, Joy Jacqueline Pereira,
Ramón Pichs-Madruga, Andy Reisinger, Roberto Sánchez Rodríguez, Sergey Semenov,
Muhammad I. Tariq, Diana Ürge-Vorsatz, Carolina Vera, Pius Yanda, Noureddine Yassaa, and
Taha Zatari.
Our heartfelt thanks go to the hosts and organizers of the scoping meeting and the four Special
Report on 1.5°C Lead Author Meetings. We gratefully acknowledge the support from the host
countries and institutions: World Meteorological Organisation, Switzerland; Ministry of Foreign
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SPM-2 Total pages: 33
Affairs, and the National Institute for Space Research (INPE), Brazil; Met Office and the University
of Exeter, The United Kingdom; Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute (SMHI),
Sweden; the Ministry of Environment Natural Resources Conservation and Tourism, the National
Climate Change Committee in the Department of Meteorological Services and the Botswana Global
Environmental Change Committee at the University of Botswana, Botswana; and the government of
the Republic of Korea. The support provided by governments and institutions, as well as through
contributions to the IPCC Trust Fund, is thankfully acknowledged as it enabled the participation of
the author teams in the preparation of the report. The efficient operation of the Working Group I
Technical Support Unit was made possible by the generous financial support provided by the
government of France and administrative and information technology support from the University
Paris Saclay (France), Institut Pierre Simon Laplace (IPSL) and the Laboratoire des Sciences du
Climat et de l’Environnement (LSCE). We thank the Norwegian Environment Agency for
supporting the preparation of the graphics for the Summary for Policymakers.
We would also like to thank Abdalah Mokssit, Secretary of the IPCC, and the staff of the IPCC
Secretariat: Kerstin Stendahl, Jonathan Lynn, Sophie Schlingemann, Judith Ewa, Mxolisi Shongwe,
Jesbin Baidya, Werani Zabula, Nina Peeva, Joelle Fernandez, Annie Courtin, Laura Biagioni and
Oksana Ekzarho. Thanks are due to Elhousseine Gouaini who served as the conference officer for
the 48th Session of the IPCC.
Finally, our particular appreciation goes to the Working Group Technical Support Units whose
tireless dedication, professionalism and enthusiasm led the production of this special report. This
report could not have been prepared without the commitment of members of the Working Group I
Technical Support Unit, all new to the IPCC, who rose to the unprecedented AR6 challenge, and
were pivotal in all aspects of the preparation of the report: Yang Chen, Sarah Connors, Melissa
Gomez, Elisabeth Lonnoy, Robin Matthews, Wilfran-Moufouma-Okia, Clotilde Péan, Roz Pidcock,
Anna Pirani, Nicholas Reay, Tim Waterfield, and Xiao Zhou. Our warmest thanks go to the
collegial and collaborative support provided by Marlies Craig, Andrew Okem, Jan Petzold, Melinda
Tignor and Nora Weyer from the WGII Technical Support Unit and Bhushan Kankal, Suvadip
Neogi, Joana Portugal Pereira from the WGIII Technical Support Unit. A special thanks goes to
Kenny Coventry, Harmen Gudde, Irene Lorenzoni, and Steve Jenkins for their support with the
figures in the Summary for Policymakers, as well as Nigel Hawtin for graphical support of the
report. In addition, the following contributions are gratefully acknowledged: Tom Maycock
(operational support and copy edit), Jatinder Padda (copy edit), Melissa Dawes (copy edit), Marilyn
Anderson (index), Vincent Grégoire (layout) and Sarah le Rouzic (intern).
Date of Summary for Policymakers: 6 October 2018
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Introduction
This report responds to the invitation for IPCC ‘... to provide a Special Report in 2018 on the
impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas
emission pathways’ contained in the Decision of the 21st Conference of Parties of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to adopt the Paris Agreement.1
The IPCC accepted the invitation in April 2016, deciding to prepare this Special Report on the
impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas
emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate
change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty.
This Summary for Policy Makers (SPM) presents the key findings of the Special Report, based on
the assessment of the available scientific, technical and socio-economic literature2 relevant to global
warming of 1.5°C and for the comparison between global warming of 1.5°C and 2°C above pre-
industrial levels. The level of confidence associated with each key finding is reported using the
IPCC calibrated language.3 The underlying scientific basis of each key finding is indicated by
references provided to chapter elements. In the SPM, knowledge gaps are identified associated with
the underlying chapters of the report.
1 Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 21.
2 The assessment covers literature accepted for publication by 15 May 2018.
3 Each finding is grounded in an evaluation of underlying evidence and agreement. A level of confidence is expressed using five
qualifiers: very low, low, medium, high and very high, and typeset in italics, for example, medium confidence. The following terms
have been used to indicate the assessed likelihood of an outcome or a result: virtually certain 99–100% probability, very likely 90–
100%, likely 66–100%, about as likely as not 33–66%, unlikely 0–33%, very unlikely 0–10%, exceptionally unlikely 0–1%.
Additional terms (extremely likely 95–100%, more likely than not >50–100%, more unlikely than likely 0–<50%, extremely unlikely
0–5%) may also be used when appropriate. Assessed likelihood is typeset in italics, for example, very likely. This is consistent with
AR5.
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A. Understanding Global Warming of 1.5°C4
A1. Human activities are estimated to have caused approximately 1.0°C of global warming5
above pre-industrial levels, with a likely range of 0.8°C to 1.2°C. Global warming is likely to
reach 1.5°C between 2030 and 2052 if it continues to increase at the current rate. (high
confidence) {1.2, Figure SPM.1}
A1.1. Reflecting the long-term warming trend since pre-industrial times, observed global mean
surface temperature (GMST) for the decade 2006–2015 was 0.87°C (likely between 0.75°C and
0.99°C)6 higher than the average over the 1850–1900 period (very high confidence). Estimated
anthropogenic global warming matches the level of observed warming to within ±20% (likely
range). Estimated anthropogenic global warming is currently increasing at 0.2°C (likely between
0.1°C and 0.3°C) per decade due to past and ongoing emissions (high confidence). {1.2.1, Table
1.1, 1.2.4}
A1.2. Warming greater than the global annual average is being experienced in many land regions
and seasons, including two to three times higher in the Arctic. Warming is generally higher over
land than over the ocean. (high confidence) {1.2.1, 1.2.2, Figure 1.1, Figure 1.3, 3.3.1, 3.3.2}
A1.3. Trends in intensity and frequency of some climate and weather extremes have been detected
over time spans during which about 0.5°C of global warming occurred (medium confidence). This
assessment is based on several lines of evidence, including attribution studies for changes in
extremes since 1950. {3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3}
A.2. Warming from anthropogenic emissions from the pre-industrial period to the present
will persist for centuries to millennia and will continue to cause further long-term changes in
the climate system, such as sea level rise, with associated impacts (high confidence), but these
emissions alone are unlikely to cause global warming of 1.5°C (medium confidence) {1.2, 3.3,
Figure 1.5, Figure SPM.1}
A2.1. Anthropogenic emissions (including greenhouse gases, aerosols and their precursors) up to
the present are unlikely to cause further warming of more than 0.5°C over the next two to three
decades (high confidence) or on a century time scale (medium confidence). {1.2.4, Figure 1.5}
4 SPM BOX.1: Core Concepts
5 Present level of global warming is defined as the average of a 30-year period centered on 2017 assuming the recent rate of warming
continues.
6 This range spans the four available peer-reviewed estimates of the observed GMST change and also accounts for additional
uncertainty due to possible short-term natural variability. {1.2.1, Table 1.1}
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A2.2. Reaching and sustaining net-zero global anthropogenic CO2 emissions and declining net non-
CO2 radiative forcing would halt anthropogenic global warming on multi-decadal timescales (high
confidence). The maximum temperature reached is then determined by cumulative net global
anthropogenic CO2 emissions up to the time of net zero CO2 emissions (high confidence) and the
level of non-CO2 radiative forcing in the decades prior to the time that maximum temperatures are
reached (medium confidence). On longer timescales, sustained net negative global anthropogenic
CO2 emissions and/or further reductions in non-CO2 radiative forcing may still be required to
prevent further warming due to Earth system feedbacks and reverse ocean acidification (medium
confidence) and will be required to minimise sea level rise (high confidence). {Cross-Chapter Box 2
in Chapter 1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, Figure 1.4, 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 3.4.4.8, 3.4.5.1, 3.6.3.2}
60
50 3 000
2 000
1 000
40
30
20
10
0 0
3
2
1
0
Cumulative emissions of CO2 and future non-CO2 radiative forcing determine
the probability of limiting warming to 1.5°C
Billion tonnes CO2 per year (GtCO2/yr) Billion tonnes CO2 (GtCO2)Watts per square metre (W/m2)
b) Stylized net global CO2 emission pathways d) Non-CO2 radiative forcing pathwaysc) Cumulative net CO2 emissions
a)Observed global temperature change and modeled
responses to stylized anthropogenic emission and forcing pathways
Observed monthly global
mean surface temperature
Estimated anthropogenic
warming to date and
likely range
Faster immediate CO2 emission reductions
limit cumulative CO2 emissions shown in
panel (c).
Maximum temperature rise is determined by cumulative net CO2 emissions and net non-CO2
radiative forcing due to methane, nitrous oxide, aerosols and other anthropogenic forcing agents.
Global warming relative to 1850-1900 (°C)
CO2 emissions
decline from 2020
to reach net zero in
2055 or 2040
Cumulative CO2
emissions in pathways
reaching net zero in
2055 and 2040
Non-CO2 radiative forcing
reduced after 2030 or
not reduced after 2030
1960
1980 2020 2060 2100 1980 2020 2060 2100 1980 2020 2060 2100
1980 2000 2020
2017
2040 2060 2080 2100
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0
Likely range of modeled responses to stylized pathways
Faster CO2 reductions (blue in b & c) result in a higher
probability of limiting warming to 1.5°C
No reduction of net non-CO2 radiative forcing (purple in d)
results in a lower probability of limiting warming to 1.5°C
Global CO2 emissions reach net zero in 2055 while net
non-CO2 radiative forcing is reduced after 2030 (grey in b, c & d)
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Figure SPM.1: Panel a: Observed monthly global mean surface temperature (GMST) change grey
line up to 2017, from the HadCRUT4, GISTEMP, Cowtan–Way, and NOAA datasets) and
estimated anthropogenic global warming (solid orange line up to 2017, with orange shading
indicating assessed likely range). Orange dashed arrow and horizontal orange error bar show
respectively central estimate and likely range of the time at which 1.5°C is reached if the current
rate of warming continues. The grey plume on the right of Panel a) shows the likely range of
warming responses, computed with a simple climate model, to a stylized pathway (hypothetical
future) in which net CO2 emissions (grey line in panels b and c) decline in a straight line from 2020
to reach net zero in 2055 and net non-CO2 radiative forcing (grey line in panel d) increases to 2030
and then declines. The blue plume in panel a) shows the response to faster CO2 emissions
reductions (blue line in panel b), reaching net zero in 2040, reducing cumulative CO2 emissions
(panel c). The purple plume shows the response to net CO2 emissions declining to zero in 2055,
with net non-CO2 forcing remaining constant after 2030. The vertical error bars on right of panel a)
show the likely ranges (thin lines) and central terciles (33rd – 66th percentiles, thick lines) of the
estimated distribution of warming in 2100 under these three stylized pathways. Vertical dotted error
bars in panels b, c and d show the likely range of historical annual and cumulative global net CO2
emissions in 2017 (data from the Global Carbon Project) and of net non-CO2 radiative forcing in
2011 from AR5, respectively. Vertical axes in panels c and d are scaled to represent approximately
equal effects on GMST. {1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 2.3, Chapter 1 Figure 1.2 & Chapter 1 Supplementary
Material, Cross-Chapter Box 2}
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A3. Climate-related risks for natural and human systems are higher for global warming of
1.5°C than at present, but lower than at 2°C (high confidence). These risks depend on the
magnitude and rate of warming, geographic location, levels of development and vulnerability,
and on the choices and implementation of adaptation and mitigation options (high confidence)
(Figure SPM.2). {1.3, 3.3, 3.4, 5.6}
A3.1. Impacts on natural and human systems from global warming have already been observed
(high confidence). Many land and ocean ecosystems and some of the services they provide have
already changed due to global warming (high confidence). {1.4, 3.4, 3.5, Figure SPM.2}
A3.2. Future climate-related risks depend on the rate, peak and duration of warming. In the
aggregate they are larger if global warming exceeds 1.5°C before returning to that level by 2100
than if global warming gradually stabilizes at 1.5°C, especially if the peak temperature is high (e.g.,
about 2°C) (high confidence). Some impacts may be long-lasting or irreversible, such as the loss of
some ecosystems (high confidence). {3.2, 3.4.4, 3.6.3, Cross-Chapter Box 8}
A3.3. Adaptation and mitigation are already occurring (high confidence). Future climate-related
risks would be reduced by the upscaling and acceleration of far-reaching, multi-level and cross-
sectoral climate mitigation and by both incremental and transformational adaptation (high
confidence). {1.2, 1.3, Table 3.5, 4.2.2, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, Box 4.2, Box 4.3, Box
4.6, 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.3.4, 4.3.5, 4.4.1, 4.4.4, 4.4.5, 4.5.3}
B. Projected Climate Change, Potential Impacts and Associated Risks
B1. Climate models project robust7 differences in regional climate characteristics between
present-day and global warming of 1.5°C,8 and between 1.5°C and 2°C.8 These differences
include increases in: mean temperature in most land and ocean regions (high confidence), hot
extremes in most inhabited regions (high confidence), heavy precipitation in several regions
(medium confidence), and the probability of drought and precipitation deficits in some regions
(medium confidence). {3.3}
B1.1. Evidence from attributed changes in some climate and weather extremes for a global warming
of about 0.5°C supports the assessment that an additional 0.5°C of warming compared to present is
associated with further detectable changes in these extremes (medium confidence). Several regional
changes in climate are assessed to occur with global warming up to 1.5°C compared to pre-
industrial levels, including warming of extreme temperatures in many regions (high confidence),
increases in frequency, intensity, and/or amount of heavy precipitation in several regions (high
confidence), and an increase in intensity or frequency of droughts in some regions (medium
confidence). {3.2, 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, Table 3.2}
B1.2. Temperature extremes on land are projected to warm more than GMST (high confidence):
extreme hot days in mid-latitudes warm by up to about 3°C at global warming of 1.5°C and about
7 Robust is here used to mean that at least two thirds of climate models show the same sign of changes at the grid point scale, and that
differences in large regions are statistically significant.
8 Projected changes in impacts between different levels of global warming are determined with respect to changes in global mean
surface air temperature.
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4°C at 2°C, and extreme cold nights in high latitudes warm by up to about 4.5°C at 1.5°C and about
6°C at 2°C (high confidence). The number of hot days is projected to increase in most land regions,
with highest increases in the tropics (high confidence). {3.3.1, 3.3.2, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in
Chapter 3}
B1.3. Risks from droughts and precipitation deficits are projected to be higher at 2°C compared to
1.5°C global warming in some regions (medium confidence). Risks from heavy precipitation events
are projected to be higher at 2°C compared to 1.5°C global warming in several northern hemisphere
high-latitude and/or high-elevation regions, eastern Asia and eastern North America (medium
confidence). Heavy precipitation associated with tropical cyclones is projected to be higher at 2°C
compared to 1.5°C global warming (medium confidence). There is generally low confidence in
projected changes in heavy precipitation at 2°C compared to 1.5°C in other regions. Heavy
precipitation when aggregated at global scale is projected to be higher at 2.0°C than at 1.5°C of
global warming (medium confidence). As a consequence of heavy precipitation, the fraction of the
global land area affected by flood hazards is projected to be larger at 2°C compared to 1.5°C of
global warming (medium confidence). {3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.5, 3.3.6}
B2. By 2100, global mean sea level rise is projected to be around 0.1 metre lower with global
warming of 1.5°C compared to 2°C (medium confidence). Sea level will continue to rise well
beyond 2100 (high confidence), and the magnitude and rate of this rise depends on future
emission pathways. A slower rate of sea level rise enables greater opportunities for adaptation
in the human and ecological systems of small islands, low-lying coastal areas and deltas
(medium confidence). {3.3, 3.4, 3.6 }
B2.1. Model-based projections of global mean sea level rise (relative to 1986-2005) suggest an
indicative range of 0.26 to 0.77 m by 2100 for 1.5°C global warming, 0.1 m (0.04-0.16 m) less than
for a global warming of 2°C (medium confidence). A reduction of 0.1 m in global sea level rise
implies that up to 10 million fewer people would be exposed to related risks, based on population in
the year 2010 and assuming no adaptation (medium confidence). {3.4.4, 3.4.5, 4.3.2}
B2.2. Sea level rise will continue beyond 2100 even if global warming is limited to 1.5°C in the
21st century (high confidence). Marine ice sheet instability in Antarctica and/or irreversible loss of
the Greenland ice sheet could result in multi-metre rise in sea level over hundreds to thousands of
years. These instabilities could be triggered around 1.5°C to 2°C of global warming (medium
confidence). {3.3.9, 3.4.5, 3.5.2, 3.6.3, Box 3.3, Figure SPM.2}
B2.3. Increasing warming amplifies the exposure of small islands, low-lying coastal areas and
deltas to the risks associated with sea level rise for many human and ecological systems, including
increased saltwater intrusion, flooding and damage to infrastructure (high confidence). Risks
associated with sea level rise are higher at 2°C compared to 1.5°C. The slower rate of sea level rise
at global warming of 1.5°C reduces these risks enabling greater opportunities for adaptation
including managing and restoring natural coastal ecosystems, and infrastructure reinforcement
(medium confidence). {3.4.5, Figure SPM.2, Box 3.5}
B3. On land, impacts on biodiversity and ecosystems, including species loss and extinction, are
projected to be lower at 1.5°C of global warming compared to 2°C. Limiting global warming
to 1.5°C compared to 2°C is projected to lower the impacts on terrestrial, freshwater, and
coastal ecosystems and to retain more of their services to humans (high confidence). (Figure
SPM.2) {3.4, 3.5, Box 3.4, Box 4.2, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 3}
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B3.1. Of 105,000 species studied,9 6% of insects, 8% of plants and 4% of vertebrates are projected
to lose over half of their climatically determined geographic range for global warming of 1.5°C,
compared with 18% of insects, 16% of plants and 8% of vertebrates for global warming of 2°C
(medium confidence). Impacts associated with other biodiversity-related risks such as forest fires,
and the spread of invasive species, are lower at 1.5°C compared to 2°C of global warming (high
confidence). {3.4.3, 3.5.2}
B3.2. Approximately 4% (interquartile range 2–7%) of the global terrestrial land area is projected to
undergo a transformation of ecosystems from one type to another at 1ºC of global warming,
compared with 13% (interquartile range 8–20%) at 2°C (medium confidence). This indicates that
the area at risk is projected to be approximately 50% lower at 1.5°C compared to 2°C (medium
confidence). {3.4.3.1, 3.4.3.5}
B3.3. High-latitude tundra and boreal forests are particularly at risk of climate change-induced
degradation and loss, with woody shrubs already encroaching into the tundra (high confidence) and
will proceed with further warming. Limiting global warming to 1.5°C rather than 2°C is projected
to prevent the thawing over centuries of a permafrost area in the range of 1.5 to 2.5 million km2
(medium confidence). {3.3.2, 3.4.3, 3.5.5}
B4. Limiting global warming to 1.5°C compared to 2ºC is projected to reduce increases in
ocean temperature as well as associated increases in ocean acidity and decreases in ocean
oxygen levels (high confidence). Consequently, limiting global warming to 1.5°C is projected
to reduce risks to marine biodiversity, fisheries, and ecosystems, and their functions and
services to humans, as illustrated by recent changes to Arctic sea ice and warm water coral
reef ecosystems (high confidence). {3.3, 3.4, 3.5, Boxes 3.4, 3.5}
B4.1. There is high confidence that the probability of a sea-ice-free Arctic Ocean during summer is
substantially lower at global warming of 1.5°C when compared to 2°C. With 1.5°C of global
warming, one sea ice-free Arctic summer is projected per century. This likelihood is increased to at
least one per decade with 2°C global warming. Effects of a temperature overshoot are reversible for
Arctic sea ice cover on decadal time scales (high confidence). {3.3.8, 3.4.4.7}
B4.2. Global warming of 1.5°C is projected to shift the ranges of many marine species, to higher
latitudes as well as increase the amount of damage to many ecosystems. It is also expected to drive
the loss of coastal resources, and reduce the productivity of fisheries and aquaculture (especially at
low latitudes). The risks of climate-induced impacts are projected to be higher at 2°C than those at
global warming of 1.5°C (high confidence). Coral reefs, for example, are projected to decline by a
further 70–90% at 1.5°C (high confidence) with larger losses (>99%) at 2ºC (very high confidence).
The risk of irreversible loss of many marine and coastal ecosystems increases with global warming,
especially at 2°C or more (high confidence). {3.4.4, Box 3.4}
B4.3. The level of ocean acidification due to increasing CO2 concentrations associated with global
warming of 1.5°C is projected to amplify the adverse effects of warming, and even further at 2°C,
9 Consistent with earlier studies, illustrative numbers were adopted from one recent meta-study.
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impacting the growth, development, calcification, survival, and thus abundance of a broad range of
species, e.g., from algae to fish (high confidence). {3.3.10, 3.4.4}
B4.4. Impacts of climate change in the ocean are increasing risks to fisheries and aquaculture via
impacts on the physiology, survivorship, habitat, reproduction, disease incidence, and risk of
invasive species (medium confidence) but are projected to be less at 1.5ºC of global warming than at
2ºC. One global fishery model, for example, projected a decrease in global annual catch for marine
fisheries of about 1.5 million tonnes for 1.5°C of global warming compared to a loss of more than 3
million tonnes for 2°C of global warming (medium confidence). {3.4.4, Box 3.4}
B5. Climate-related risks to health, livelihoods, food security, water supply, human security,
and economic growth are projected to increase with global warming of 1.5°C and increase
further with 2°C. (Figure SPM.2) {3.4, 3.5, 5.2, Box 3.2, Box 3.3, Box 3.5, Box 3.6, Cross-
Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in
Chapter 5, 5.2}
B5.1. Populations at disproportionately higher risk of adverse consequences of global warming of
1.5°C and beyond include disadvantaged and vulnerable populations, some indigenous peoples, and
local communities dependent on agricultural or coastal livelihoods (high confidence). Regions at
disproportionately higher risk include Arctic ecosystems, dryland regions, small-island developing
states, and least developed countries (high confidence). Poverty and disadvantages are expected to
increase in some populations as global warming increases; limiting global warming to 1.5°C,
compared with 2°C, could reduce the number of people both exposed to climate-related risks and
susceptible to poverty by up to several hundred million by 2050 (medium confidence). {3.4.10,
3.4.11, Box 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, Cross-
Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5, 4.2.2.2, 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.3, 5.6.3}
B5.2. Any increase in global warming is projected to affect human health, with primarily negative
consequences (high confidence). Lower risks are projected at 1.5°C than at 2°C for heat-related
morbidity and mortality (very high confidence) and for ozone-related mortality if emissions needed
for ozone formation remain high (high confidence). Urban heat islands often amplify the impacts of
heatwaves in cities (high confidence). Risks from some vector-borne diseases, such as malaria and
dengue fever, are projected to increase with warming from 1.5°C to 2°C, including potential shifts
in their geographic range (high confidence). {3.4.7, 3.4.8, 3.5.5.8}
B5.3. Limiting warming to 1.5°C, compared with 2ºC, is projected to result in smaller net
reductions in yields of maize, rice, wheat, and potentially other cereal crops, particularly in sub-
Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central and South America; and in the CO2 dependent,
nutritional quality of rice and wheat (high confidence). Reductions in projected food availability are
larger at 2ºC than at 1.5°C of global warming in the Sahel, southern Africa, the Mediterranean,
central Europe, and the Amazon (medium confidence). Livestock are projected to be adversely
affected with rising temperatures, depending on the extent of changes in feed quality, spread of
diseases, and water resource availability (high confidence). {3.4.6, 3.5.4, 3.5.5, Box 3.1, Cross-
Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4}
B5.4. Depending on future socioeconomic conditions, limiting global warming to 1.5°C, compared
to 2°C, may reduce the proportion of the world population exposed to a climate-change induced
increase in water stress by up to 50%, although there is considerable variability between regions
(medium confidence). Many small island developing states would experience lower water stress as a
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result of projected changes in aridity when global warming is limited to 1.5°C, as compared to 2°C
(medium confidence). {3.3.5, 3.4.2, 3.4.8, 3.5.5, Box 3.2, Box 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter
4}
B5.5. Risks to global aggregated economic growth due to climate change impacts are projected to
be lower at 1.5°C than at 2°C by the end of this century10 (medium confidence). This excludes the
costs of mitigation, adaptation investments and the benefits of adaptation. Countries in the tropics
and Southern Hemisphere subtropics are projected to experience the largest impacts on economic
growth due to climate change should global warming increase from 1.5°C to 2 °C (medium
confidence). {3.5.2, 3.5.3}
B5.6. Exposure to multiple and compound climate-related risks increases between 1.5°C and 2°C of
global warming, with greater proportions of people both so exposed and susceptible to poverty in
Africa and Asia (high confidence). For global warming from 1.5°C to 2°C, risks across energy,
food, and water sectors could overlap spatially and temporally, creating new and exacerbating
current hazards, exposures, and vulnerabilities that could affect increasing numbers of people and
regions (medium confidence). {Box 3.5, 3.3.1, 3.4.5.3, 3.4.5.6, 3.4.11, 3.5.4.9}
B5.7. There are multiple lines of evidence that since the AR5 the assessed levels of risk increased
for four of the five Reasons for Concern (RFCs) for global warming to 2°C (high confidence). The
risk transitions by degrees of global warming are now: from high to very high between 1.5°C and
2°C for RFC1 (Unique and threatened systems) (high confidence); from moderate to high risk
between 1.0°C and 1.5°C for RFC2 (Extreme weather events) (medium confidence); from
moderate to high risk between 1.5°C and 2°C for RFC3 (Distribution of impacts) (high confidence);
from moderate to high risk between 1.5°C and 2.5°C for RFC4 (Global aggregate impacts) (medium
confidence); and from moderate to high risk between 1°C and 2.5°C for RFC5 (Large-scale singular
events) (medium confidence). (Figure SPM.2) {3.4.13; 3.5, 3.5.2}
10 Here, impacts on economic growth refer to changes in GDP. Many impacts, such as loss of human lives, cultural heritage, and
ecosystem services, are difficult to value and monetize.
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How the level of global warming affects impacts and/or risks associated
with the Reasons for Concern (RFCs) and selected natural, managed and
human systems
Impacts and risks associated with the Reasons for Concern (RFCs)
Purple indicates very high
risks of severe impacts/risks
and the presence of
significant irreversibility or
the persistence of
climate-related hazards,
combined with limited
ability to adapt due to the
nature of the hazard or
impacts/risks.
Red indicates severe and
widespread impacts/risks.
Yellow indicates that
impacts/risks are detectable
and attributable to climate
change with at least medium
confidence.
White indicates that no
impacts are detectable and
attributable to climate
change.
Five Reasons For Concern (RFCs) illustrate the impacts and risks of
different levels of global warming for people, economies and ecosystems
across sectors and regions.
Heat-related morbidity and mortality
Level of additional impact/risk due to climate change
RFC1
Unique and threatened
systems
RFC2
Extreme weather
events
RFC4
Global aggregate
impacts
RFC5
Large scale singular
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RFC3
Distribution of impacts
Warm water corals TerrestrialEcosystems Tourism
2006-2015
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Impacts and risks for selected natural, managed and human systems
Confidence level for transition: L=Low, M=Medium, H=High and VH=Very high
Mangroves Small scale low latitude fisheries
ArcticRegion
Coastal flooding Fluvial Flooding Crop
Yields
Undetectable
Moderate
High
Very high
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Figure SPM.2: Five integrative reasons for concern (RFCs) provide a framework for summarizing
key impacts and risks across sectors and regions, and were introduced in the IPCC Third
Assessment Report. RFCs illustrate the implications of global warming for people, economies, and
ecosystems. Impacts and/or risks for each RFC are based on assessment of the new literature that
has appeared. As in the AR5, this literature was used to make expert judgments to assess the levels
of global warming at which levels of impact and/or risk are undetectable, moderate, high or very
high. The selection of impacts and risks to natural, managed and human systems in the lower panel
is illustrative and is not intended to be fully comprehensive. RFC1 Unique and threatened
systems: ecological and human systems that have restricted geographic ranges constrained by
climate related conditions and have high endemism or other distinctive properties. Examples
include coral reefs, the Arctic and its indigenous people, mountain glaciers, and biodiversity
hotspots. RFC2 Extreme weather events: risks/impacts to human health, livelihoods, assets, and
ecosystems from extreme weather events such as heat waves, heavy rain, drought and associated
wildfires, and coastal flooding. RFC3 Distribution of impacts: risks/impacts that
disproportionately affect particular groups due to uneven distribution of physical climate change
hazards, exposure or vulnerability. RFC4 Global aggregate impacts: global monetary damage,
global scale degradation and loss of ecosystems and biodiversity. RFC5 Large-scale singular
events: are relatively large, abrupt and sometimes irreversible changes in systems that are caused
by global warming. Examples include disintegration of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets.
{3.4, 3.5, 3.5.2.1, 3.5.2.2, 3.5.2.3, 3.5.2.4, 3.5.2.5, 5.4.1 5.5.3, 5.6.1, Box 3.4}
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B6. Most adaptation needs will be lower for global warming of 1.5°C compared to 2°C (high
confidence). There are a wide range of adaptation options that can reduce the risks of climate
change (high confidence). There are limits to adaptation and adaptive capacity for some
human and natural systems at global warming of 1.5°C, with associated losses (medium
confidence). The number and availability of adaptation options vary by sector (medium
confidence). {Table 3.5, 4.3, 4.5, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in
Chapter 5}
B6.1. A wide range of adaptation options are available to reduce the risks to natural and managed
ecosystems (e.g., ecosystem-based adaptation, ecosystem restoration and avoided degradation and
deforestation, biodiversity management, sustainable aquaculture, and local knowledge and
indigenous knowledge), the risks of sea level rise (e.g., coastal defence and hardening), and the
risks to health, livelihoods, food, water, and economic growth, especially in rural landscapes (e.g.,
efficient irrigation, social safety nets, disaster risk management, risk spreading and sharing,
community-based adaptation) and urban areas (e.g., green infrastructure, sustainable land use and
planning, and sustainable water management) (medium confidence). {4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.3.5,
4.5.3, 4.5.4, 5.3.2, Box 4.2, Box 4.3, Box 4.6, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4}.
B6.2. Adaptation is expected to be more challenging for ecosystems, food and health systems at
2°C of global warming than for 1.5°C (medium confidence). Some vulnerable regions, including
small islands and Least Developed Countries, are projected to experience high multiple interrelated
climate risks even at global warming of 1.5°C (high confidence). {3.3.1, 3.4.5, Box 3.5, Table 3.5,
Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, 5.6, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5, Box 5.3}
B6.3. Limits to adaptive capacity exist at 1.5°C of global warming, become more pronounced at
higher levels of warming and vary by sector, with site-specific implications for vulnerable regions,
ecosystems, and human health (medium confidence) {Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5, Box 3.5,
Table 3.5}
C. Emission Pathways and System Transitions Consistent with 1.5°C Global Warming
C1. In model pathways with no or limited overshoot of 1.5°C, global net anthropogenic CO2
emissions decline by about 45% from 2010 levels by 2030 (40–60% interquartile range),
reaching net zero around 2050 (2045–2055 interquartile range). For limiting global warming
to below 2°C11 CO2 emissions are projected to decline by about 20% by 2030 in most
pathways (10–30% interquartile range) and reach net zero around 2075 (2065–2080
interquartile range). Non-CO2 emissions in pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C show
deep reductions that are similar to those in pathways limiting warming to 2°C. (high
confidence) (Figure SPM.3a) {2.1, 2.3, Table 2.4}
C1.1. CO2 emissions reductions that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot can
involve different portfolios of mitigation measures, striking different balances between lowering
energy and resource intensity, rate of decarbonization, and the reliance on carbon dioxide removal.
Different portfolios face different implementation challenges, and potential synergies and trade-offs
with sustainable development. (high confidence). (Figure SPM.3b) {2.3.2, 2.3.4, 2.4, 2.5.3}
11 References to pathways limiting global warming to 2oC are based on a 66% probability of staying below 2oC.
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C1.2. Modelled pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot involve
deep reductions in emissions of methane and black carbon (35% or more of both by 2050 relative to
2010). These pathways also reduce most of the cooling aerosols, which partially offsets mitigation
effects for two to three decades. Non-CO2 emissions12 can be reduced as a result of broad mitigation
measures in the energy sector. In addition, targeted non-CO2 mitigation measures can reduce nitrous
oxide and methane from agriculture, methane from the waste sector, some sources of black carbon,
and hydrofluorocarbons. High bioenergy demand can increase emissions of nitrous oxide in some
1.5°C pathways, highlighting the importance of appropriate management approaches. Improved air
quality resulting from projected reductions in many non-CO2 emissions provide direct and
immediate population health benefits in all 1.5°C model pathways. (high confidence) (Figure
SPM.3a) {2.2.1, 2.3.3, 2.4.4, 2.5.3, 4.3.6, 5.4.2}
C1.3. Limiting global warming requires limiting the total cumulative global anthropogenic
emissions of CO2 since the preindustrial period, i.e. staying within a total carbon budget (high
confidence).13 By the end of 2017, anthropogenic CO2 emissions since the preindustrial period are
estimated to have reduced the total carbon budget for 1.5°C by approximately 2200 ± 320 GtCO2
(medium confidence). The associated remaining budget is being depleted by current emissions of 42
± 3 GtCO2 per year (high confidence). The choice of the measure of global temperature affects the
estimated remaining carbon budget. Using global mean surface air temperature, as in AR5, gives an
estimate of the remaining carbon budget of 580 GtCO2 for a 50% probability of limiting warming to
1.5°C, and 420 GtCO2 for a 66% probability (medium confidence).14 Alternatively, using GMST
gives estimates of 770 and 570 GtCO2, for 50% and 66% probabilities,15 respectively (medium
confidence). Uncertainties in the size of these estimated remaining carbon budgets are substantial
and depend on several factors. Uncertainties in the climate response to CO2 and non-CO2 emissions
contribute ±400 GtCO2 and the level of historic warming contributes ±250 GtCO2 (medium
confidence). Potential additional carbon release from future permafrost thawing and methane
release from wetlands would reduce budgets by up to 100 GtCO2 over the course of this century and
more thereafter (medium confidence). In addition, the level of non-CO2 mitigation in the future
could alter the remaining carbon budget by 250 GtCO2 in either direction (medium confidence).
{1.2.4, 2.2.2, 2.6.1, Table 2.2, Chapter 2 Supplementary Material}
C1.4. Solar radiation modification (SRM) measures are not included in any of the available
assessed pathways. Although some SRM measures may be theoretically effective in reducing an
overshoot, they face large uncertainties and knowledge gaps as well as substantial risks,
12 Non-CO2 emissions included in this report are all anthropogenic emissions other than CO2 that result in radiative forcing. These
include short-lived climate forcers, such as methane, some fluorinated gases, ozone precursors, aerosols or aerosol precursors, such
as black carbon and sulphur dioxide, respectively, as well as long-lived greenhouse gases, such as nitrous oxide or some fluorinated
gases. The radiative forcing associated with non-CO2 emissions and changes in surface albedo is referred to as non-CO2 radiative
forcing. {x.y}
13 There is a clear scientific basis for a total carbon budget consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5°C. However, neither this
total carbon budget nor the fraction of this budget taken up by past emissions were assessed in this report.
14 Irrespective of the measure of global temperature used, updated understanding and further advances in methods have led to an
increase in the estimated remaining carbon budget of about 300 GtCO2 compared to AR5. (medium confidence) {x.y}
15 These estimates use observed GMST to 2006–2015 and estimate future temperature changes using near surface air temperatures.
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institutional and social constraints to deployment related to governance, ethics, and impacts on
sustainable development. They also do not mitigate ocean acidification. (medium confidence).
{4.3.8, Cross-Chapter Box 10 in Chapter 4}
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
Black carbon emissions
Nitrous oxide emissions
Methane emissions
Emissions of non-CO2 forcers are also reduced
or limited in pathways limiting global warming
to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot, but
they do not reach zero globally.
Non-CO₂ emissions relative to 2010
Billion tonnes of CO₂/yr
Global emissions pathway characteristics
General characteristics of the evolution of anthropogenic net emissions of CO2, and total emissions of
methane, black carbon, and nitrous oxide in model pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or
limited overshoot. Net emissions are defined as anthropogenic emissions reduced by anthropogenic
removals. Reductions in net emissions can be achieved through different portfolios of mitigation measures
illustrated in Figure SPM3B.
Global total net CO2 emissions
2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
0
1
2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
0
1
2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
0
1
Four illustrative model pathways
In pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C
with no or limited overshoot as well as in
pathways with a high overshoot, CO emissions
are reduced to net zero globally around 2050.
P1P2
P3
P4
Pathways with high overshoot
Pathways limiting global warming below 2°C
(Not shown above)
Pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or low overshootTiming of net zero CO2
Line widths depict the 5-95th
percentile and the 25-75th
percentile of scenarios
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Figure SPM.3a: Global emissions pathway characteristics. The main panel shows global net anthropogenic CO2 emissions in pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited (less than 0.1°C) overshoot and pathways with higher overshoot. The shaded area shows the full range for pathways analysed in this report. The panels on the right show non-CO2 emissions ranges for three compounds with large historical forcing and a substantial portion of emissions coming from sources distinct from those central to CO2 mitigation. Shaded areas in these panels show the 5–95% (light shading) and interquartile (dark shading) ranges of pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot. Box and whiskers at the bottom of the figure show the timing of pathways reaching global net zero CO2 emission levels, and a comparison with pathways limiting global warming to 2°C with at least 66% probability. Four illustrative model pathways are highlighted in the main panel and are labelled P1, P2, P3 and P4, corresponding to the LED, S1, S2, and S5 pathways assessed in Chapter 2. Descriptions and characteristics of these pathways are available in Figure SPM3b. {2.1, 2.2, 2.3, Figure 2.5, Figure 2.10, Figure 2.11}
Breakdown of contributions to global net CO2 emissions in four illustrative model pathways
P1: A scenario in which social,
business, and technological
innovations result in lower energy
demand up to 2050 while living
standards rise, especially in the global
South. A down-sized energy system
enables rapid decarbonisation of
energy supply. Afforestation is the only
CDR option considered; neither fossil
fuels with CCS nor BECCS are used.
P2: A scenario with a broad focus on
sustainability including energy
intensity, human development,
economic convergence and
international cooperation, as well as
shifts towards sustainable and healthy
consumption patterns, low-carbon
technology innovation, and
well-managed land systems with
limited societal acceptability for BECCS.
P3: A middle-of-the-road scenario in
which societal as well as technological
development follows historical
patterns. Emissions reductions are
mainly achieved by changing the way in
which energy and products are
produced, and to a lesser degree by
reductions in demand.
P4: A resource and energy-intensive
scenario in which economic growth and
globalization lead to widespread
adoption of greenhouse-gas intensive
lifestyles, including high demand for
transportation fuels and livestock
products. Emissions reductions are
mainly achieved through technological
means, making strong use of CDR
through the deployment of BECCS.
Fossil fuel and industry AFOLU BECCS
-20
0
20
40
2020 2060 2100
-20
0
20
40
2020 2060 2100
-20
0
20
40
2020 2060 2100
-20
0
20
40
2020 2060 2100
No or low overshoot
-58
-93
-50
-82
-15
-32
60
77
-78
-97
-37
-87
-25
-74
59
150
-11
-16
430
832
0
0
22
-24
-33
5
6
Pathway classification
CO2 emission change in 2030 (% rel to 2010)
in 2050 (% rel to 2010)
Kyoto-GHG emissions* in 2030 (% rel to 2010)
in 2050 (% rel to 2010)
Final energy demand** in 2030 (% rel to 2010)
in 2050 (% rel to 2010)
Renewable share in electricity in 2030 (%)
in 2050 (%)
Primary energy from coal in 2030 (% rel to 2010)
in 2050 (% rel to 2010)
from oil in 2030 (% rel to 2010)
in 2050 (% rel to 2010)
from gas in 2030 (% rel to 2010)
in 2050 (% rel to 2010)
from nuclear in 2030 (% rel to 2010)
in 2050 (% rel to 2010)
from biomass in 2030 (% rel to 2010)
in 2050 (% rel to 2010)
from non-biomass renewables in 2030 (% rel to 2010)
in 2050 (% rel to 2010)
Cumulative CCS until 2100 (GtCO2)
of which BECCS (GtCO2)
Land area of bioenergy crops in 2050 (million hectare)
Agricultural CH4 emissions in 2030 (% rel to 2010)
in 2050 (% rel to 2010)
Agricultural N2O emissions in 2030 (% rel to 2010)
in 2050 (% rel to 2010)
No or low overshoot
-47
-95
-49
-89
-5
2
58
81
-61
-77
-13
-50
-20
-53
83
98
0
49
470
1327
348
151
93
-48
-69
-26
-26
No or low overshoot
-41
-91
-35
-78
17
21
48
63
-75
-73
-3
-81
33
21
98
501
36
121
315
878
687
414
283
1
-23
15
0
High overshoot
4
-97
-2
-80
39
44
25
70
-59
-97
86
-32
37
-48
106
468
-1
418
110
1137
1218
1191
724
14
2
3
39
No or low overshoot
(-59,-40)
(-104,-91)
(-55,-38)
(-93,-81)
(-12, 7)
(-11, 22)
(47, 65)
(69, 87)
(-78, -59)
(-95, -74)
(-34,3)
(-78,-31)
(-26,21)
(-56,6)
(44,102)
(91,190)
(29,80)
(123,261)
(243,438)
(575,1300)
(550, 1017)
(364, 662)
(151, 320)
(-30,-11)
(-46,-23)
(-21,4)
(-26,1)
Characteristics of four illustrative model pathways
Different mitigation strategies can achieve the net emissions reductions that would be required to follow a
pathway that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot. All pathways use Carbon Dioxide
Removal (CDR), but the amount varies across pathways, as do the relative contributions of Bioenergy with
Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) and removals in the Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU)
sector. This has implications for the emissions and several other pathway characteristics.
P1 P2 P3 P4
P1 P2 P3 P4 Interquartile range
Billion tonnes CO₂ per year (GtCO2/yr)
Global indicators
Billion tonnes CO₂ per year (GtCO2/yr)Billion tonnes CO₂ per year (GtCO2/yr)Billion tonnes CO₂ per year (GtCO2/yr)
NOTE: Indicators have been selected to show global trends identified by the Chapter 2 assessment. National and sectoral characteristics can differ substantially from the global trends shown above.* Kyoto-gas emissions are based on SAR GWP-100
** Changes in energy demand are associated with improvements in energy
efficiency and behaviour change
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Figure SPM.3b: Characteristics of four illustrative model pathways in relation to global warming of
1.5°C introduced in Figure SPM3a. These pathways were selected to show a range of potential
mitigation approaches and vary widely in their projected energy and land use, as well as their
assumptions about future socioeconomic developments, including economic and population growth,
equity and sustainability. A breakdown of the global net anthropogenic CO2 emissions into the
contributions in terms of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel and industry, agriculture, forestry and other
land use (AFOLU), and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) is shown. AFOLU
estimates reported here are not necessarily comparable with countries’ estimates. Further
characteristics for each of these pathways are listed below each pathway. These pathways illustrate
relative global differences in mitigation strategies, but do not represent central estimates, national
strategies, and do not indicate requirements. For comparison, the right-most column shows the
interquartile ranges across pathways with no or limited overshoot of 1.5°C. Pathways P1, P2, P3
and P4, correspond to the LED, S1, S2, and S5 pathways assessed in Chapter 2. (Figure SPM.3a)
{2.2.1, 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 2.4.4, 2.5.3, Figure 2.5, Figure 2.6, Figure 2.9, Figure
2.10, Figure 2.11, Figure 2.14, Figure 2.15, Figure 2.16, Figure 2.17, Figure 2.24, Figure 2.25,
Table 2.4, Table 2.6, Table 2.7, Table 2.9, Table 4.1}
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C2. Pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot would require
rapid and far-reaching transitions in energy, land, urban and infrastructure (including
transport and buildings), and industrial systems (high confidence). These systems transitions
are unprecedented in terms of scale, but not necessarily in terms of speed, and imply deep
emissions reductions in all sectors, a wide portfolio of mitigation options and a significant
upscaling of investments in those options (medium confidence). {2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5}
C2.1. Pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot show system
changes that are more rapid and pronounced over the next two decades than in 2°C pathways (high
confidence). The rates of system changes associated with limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no
or limited overshoot have occurred in the past within specific sectors, technologies and spatial
contexts, but there is no documented historic precedent for their scale (medium confidence). {2.3.3,
2.3.4, 2.4, 2.5, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4}
C2.2. In energy systems, modelled global pathways (considered in the literature) limiting global
warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot (for more details see Figure SPM.3b), generally
meet energy service demand with lower energy use, including through enhanced energy efficiency,
and show faster electrification of energy end use compared to 2°C (high confidence). In 1.5°C
pathways with no or limited overshoot, low-emission energy sources are projected to have a higher
share, compared with 2°C pathways, particularly before 2050 (high confidence). In 1.5°C pathways
with no or limited overshoot, renewables are projected to supply 70–85% (interquartile range) of
electricity in 2050 (high confidence). In electricity generation, shares of nuclear and fossil fuels
with carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) are modelled to increase in most 1.5°C pathways
with no or limited overshoot. In modelled 1.5°C pathways with limited or no overshoot, the use of
CCS would allow the electricity generation share of gas to be approximately 8% (3–11%
interquartile range) of global electricity in 2050, while the use of coal shows a steep reduction in all
pathways and would be reduced to close to 0% (0–2%) of electricity (high confidence). While
acknowledging the challenges, and differences between the options and national circumstances,
political, economic, social and technical feasibility of solar energy, wind energy and electricity
storage technologies have substantially improved over the past few years (high confidence). These
improvements signal a potential system transition in electricity generation (Figure SPM.3b) {2.4.1,
2.4.2, Figure 2.1, Table 2.6, Table 2.7, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3, 4.2.1, 4.3.1, 4.3.3, 4.5.2}
C2.3. CO2 emissions from industry in pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or
limited overshoot are projected to be about 75–90% (interquartile range) lower in 2050 relative to
2010, as compared to 50–80% for global warming of 2oC (medium confidence). Such reductions can
be achieved through combinations of new and existing technologies and practices, including
electrification, hydrogen, sustainable bio-based feedstocks, product substitution, and carbon
capture, utilization and storage (CCUS). These options are technically proven at various scales but
their large-scale deployment may be limited by economic, financial, human capacity and
institutional constraints in specific contexts, and specific characteristics of large-scale industrial
installations. In industry, emissions reductions by energy and process efficiency by themselves are
insufficient for limiting warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot (high confidence). {2.4.3,
4.2.1, Table 4.1, Table 4.3, 4.3.3, 4.3.4, 4.5.2}
C2.4. The urban and infrastructure system transition consistent with limiting global warming to
1.5°C with no or limited overshoot would imply, for example, changes in land and urban planning
practices, as well as deeper emissions reductions in transport and buildings compared to pathways
that limit global warming below 2°C (see 2.4.3; 4.3.3; 4.2.1) (medium confidence). Technical
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measures and practices enabling deep emissions reductions include various energy efficiency
options. In pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot, the electricity
share of energy demand in buildings would be about 55–75% in 2050 compared to 50–70% in 2050
for 2°C global warming (medium confidence). In the transport sector, the share of low-emission
final energy would rise from less than 5% in 2020 to about 35–65% in 2050 compared to 25–45%
for 2°C global warming (medium confidence). Economic, institutional and socio-cultural barriers
may inhibit these urban and infrastructure system transitions, depending on national, regional and
local circumstances, capabilities and the availability of capital (high confidence). {2.3.4, 2.4.3,
4.2.1, Table 4.1, 4.3.3, 4.5.2}.
C2.5. Transitions in global and regional land use are found in all pathways limiting global warming
to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot, but their scale depends on the pursued mitigation portfolio.
Model pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot project the
conversion of 0.5–8 million km2 of pasture and 0–5 million km2 of non-pasture agricultural land for
food and feed crops into 1–7 million km2 for energy crops and a 1 million km2 reduction to 10
million km2 increase in forests by 2050 relative to 2010 (medium confidence).16 Land use transitions
of similar magnitude can be observed in modelled 2°C pathways (medium confidence). Such large
transitions pose profound challenges for sustainable management of the various demands on land
for human settlements, food, livestock feed, fibre, bioenergy, carbon storage, biodiversity and other
ecosystem services (high confidence). Mitigation options limiting the demand for land include
sustainable intensification of land use practices, ecosystem restoration and changes towards less
resource-intensive diets (high confidence). The implementation of land-based mitigation options
would require overcoming socio-economic, institutional, technological, financing and
environmental barriers that differ across regions (high confidence). {2.4.4, Figure 2.24, 4.3.2, 4.5.2,
Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 3}
C2.6 Total annual average energy-related mitigation investment for the period 2015 to 2050 in
pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C is estimated to be around 900 billion USD2015 (range of 180
billion to 1800 billion USD2015 across six models17). This corresponds to total annual average
energy supply investments of 1600 to 3800 billion USD2015 and total annual average energy
demand investments of 700 to 1000 billion USD2015 for the period 2015 to 2050, and an increase
in total energy-related investments of about 12% (range of 3% to 23%) in 1.5°C pathways relative
to 2°C pathways. Average annual investment in low-carbon energy technologies and energy
efficiency are upscaled by roughly a factor of five (range of factor of 4 to 5) by 2050 compared to
2015 (medium confidence). {2.5.2, Box 4.8, Figure 2.27}
C2.7. Modelled pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot project a
wide range of global average discounted marginal abatement costs over the 21st century. They are
roughly 3-4 times higher than in pathways limiting global warming to below 2°C (high confidence).
The economic literature distinguishes marginal abatement costs from total mitigation costs in the
economy. The literature on total mitigation costs of 1.5°C mitigation pathways is limited and was
not assessed in this report. Knowledge gaps remain in the integrated assessment of the economy
wide costs and benefits of mitigation in line with pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C. {2.5.2; 2.6;
Figure 2.26}
16 The projected land use changes presented are not deployed to their upper limits simultaneously in a single pathway.
17 Including two pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot and four pathways with high overshoot.
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C3. All pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with limited or no overshoot project the
use of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) on the order of 100–1000 GtCO2 over the 21st century.
CDR would be used to compensate for residual emissions and, in most cases, achieve net
negative emissions to return global warming to 1.5°C following a peak (high confidence). CDR
deployment of several hundreds of GtCO2 is subject to multiple feasibility and sustainability
constraints (high confidence). Significant near-term emissions reductions and measures to
lower energy and land demand can limit CDR deployment to a few hundred GtCO2 without
reliance on bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) (high confidence). {2.3, 2.4,
3.6.2, 4.3, 5.4}
C3.1. Existing and potential CDR measures include afforestation and reforestation, land
restoration and soil carbon sequestration, BECCS, direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS),
enhanced weathering and ocean alkalinization. These differ widely in terms of maturity, potentials,
costs, risks, co-benefits and trade-offs (high confidence). To date, only a few published pathways
include CDR measures other than afforestation and BECCS. {2.3.4, 3.6.2, 4.3.2, 4.3.7}
C3.2. In pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with limited or no overshoot, BECCS
deployment is projected to range from 0–1, 0–8, and 0–16 GtCO2 yr-1 in 2030, 2050, and 2100,
respectively, while agriculture, forestry and land-use (AFOLU) related CDR measures are projected
to remove 0–5, 1–11, and 1–5 GtCO2 yr-1 in these years (medium confidence). The upper end of
these deployment ranges by mid-century exceeds the BECCS potential of up to 5 GtCO2 yr-1 and
afforestation potential of up to 3.6 GtCO2 yr-1 assessed based on recent literature (medium
confidence). Some pathways avoid BECCS deployment completely through demand-side measures
and greater reliance on AFOLU-related CDR measures (medium confidence). The use of bioenergy
can be as high or even higher when BECCS is excluded compared to when it is included due to its
potential for replacing fossil fuels across sectors (high confidence). (Figure SPM.3b) {2.3.3, 2.3.4,
2.4.2, 3.6.2, 4.3.1, 4.2.3, 4.3.2, 4.3.7, 4.4.3, Table 2.4}
C3.3. Pathways that overshoot 1.5°C of global warming rely on CDR exceeding residual CO2
emissions later in the century to return to below 1.5°C by 2100, with larger overshoots requiring
greater amounts of CDR (Figure SPM.3b). (high confidence). Limitations on the speed, scale, and
societal acceptability of CDR deployment hence determine the ability to return global warming to
below 1.5°C following an overshoot. Carbon cycle and climate system understanding is still limited
about the effectiveness of net negative emissions to reduce temperatures after they peak (high
confidence). {2.2, 2.3.4, 2.3.5, 2.6, 4.3.7, 4.5.2, Table 4.11}
C3.4. Most current and potential CDR measures could have significant impacts on land, energy,
water, or nutrients if deployed at large scale (high confidence). Afforestation and bioenergy may
compete with other land uses and may have significant impacts on agricultural and food systems,
biodiversity and other ecosystem functions and services (high confidence). Effective governance is
needed to limit such trade-offs and ensure permanence of carbon removal in terrestrial, geological
and ocean reservoirs (high confidence). Feasibility and sustainability of CDR use could be enhanced
by a portfolio of options deployed at substantial, but lesser scales, rather than a single option at very
large scale (high confidence). (Figure SPM.3b). {2.3.4, 2.4.4, 2.5.3, 2.6, 3.6.2, 4.3.2, 4.3.7, 4.5.2,
5.4.1, 5.4.2; Cross-Chapter Boxes 7 and 8 in Chapter 3, Table 4.11, Table 5.3, Figure 5.3}
C3.5. Some AFOLU-related CDR measures such as restoration of natural ecosystems and soil
carbon sequestration could provide co-benefits such as improved biodiversity, soil quality, and local
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food security. If deployed at large scale, they would require governance systems enabling
sustainable land management to conserve and protect land carbon stocks and other ecosystem
functions and services (medium confidence). (Figure SPM.4) {2.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.4.2, 2.4.4, 3.6.2, 5.4.1,
Cross-Chapter Boxes 3 in Chapter 1 and 7 in Chapter 3, 4.3.2, 4.3.7, 4.4.1, 4.5.2, Table 2.4}
D. Strengthening the Global Response in the Context of Sustainable Development and Efforts
to Eradicate Poverty
D1. Estimates of the global emissions outcome of current nationally stated mitigation
ambitions as submitted under the Paris Agreement would lead to global greenhouse gas
emissions18 in 2030 of 52–58 GtCO2eq yr-1 (medium confidence). Pathways reflecting these
ambitions would not limit global warming to 1.5°C, even if supplemented by very challenging
increases in the scale and ambition of emissions reductions after 2030 (high confidence).
Avoiding overshoot and reliance on future large-scale deployment of carbon dioxide removal
(CDR) can only be achieved if global CO2 emissions start to decline well before 2030 (high
confidence). {1.2, 2.3, 3.3, 3.4, 4.2, 4.4, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4}
D1.1. Pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot show clear
emission reductions by 2030 (high confidence). All but one show a decline in global greenhouse gas
emissions to below 35 GtCO2eq yr-1 in 2030, and half of available pathways fall within the 25–30
GtCO2eq yr-1 range (interquartile range), a 40–50% reduction from 2010 levels (high confidence).
Pathways reflecting current nationally stated mitigation ambition until 2030 are broadly consistent
with cost-effective pathways that result in a global warming of about 3°C by 2100, with warming
continuing afterwards (medium confidence). {2.3.3, 2.3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4,
5.5.3.2}
D1.2. Overshoot trajectories result in higher impacts and associated challenges compared to
pathways that limit global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot (high confidence).
Reversing warming after an overshoot of 0.2°C or larger during this century would require
upscaling and deployment of CDR at rates and volumes that might not be achievable given
considerable implementation challenges (medium confidence). {1.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.3.5, 2.5.1, 3.3, 4.3.7,
Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 3, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4}
D1.3. The lower the emissions in 2030, the lower the challenge in limiting global warming to 1.5°C
after 2030 with no or limited overshoot (high confidence). The challenges from delayed actions to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions include the risk of cost escalation, lock-in in carbon-emitting
infrastructure, stranded assets, and reduced flexibility in future response options in the medium to
long-term (high confidence). These may increase uneven distributional impacts between countries at
different stages of development (medium confidence). {2.3.5, 4.4.5, 5.4.2}
D2. The avoided climate change impacts on sustainable development, eradication of poverty
and reducing inequalities would be greater if global warming were limited to 1.5°C rather
than 2°C, if mitigation and adaptation synergies are maximized while trade-offs are
minimized (high confidence). {1.1, 1.4, 2.5, 3.3, 3.4, 5.2, Table 5.1}
18 GHG emissions have been aggregated with 100-year GWP values as introduced in the IPCC Second Assessment Report
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D2.1. Climate change impacts and responses are closely linked to sustainable development which
balances social well-being, economic prosperity and environmental protection. The United Nations
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted in 2015, provide an established framework for
assessing the links between global warming of 1.5°C or 2°C and development goals that include
poverty eradication, reducing inequalities, and climate action (high confidence) {Cross-Chapter Box
4 in Chapter 1, 1.4, 5.1}
D2.2. The consideration of ethics and equity can help address the uneven distribution of adverse
impacts associated with 1.5°C and higher levels of global warming, as well as those from mitigation
and adaptation, particularly for poor and disadvantaged populations, in all societies (high
confidence). {1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.4.3, 2.5.3, 3.4.10, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3. 5.4, Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 1,
Cross-Chapter Boxes 6 and 8 in Chapter 3, and Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5}
D2.3. Mitigation and adaptation consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5°C are underpinned
by enabling conditions, assessed in SR1.5 across the geophysical, environmental-ecological,
technological, economic, socio-cultural and institutional dimensions of feasibility. Strengthened
multi-level governance, institutional capacity, policy instruments, technological innovation and
transfer and mobilization of finance, and changes in human behaviour and lifestyles are enabling
conditions that enhance the feasibility of mitigation and adaptation options for 1.5°C consistent
systems transitions. (high confidence) {1.4, Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 1, 4.4, 4.5, 5.6}
D3. Adaptation options specific to national contexts, if carefully selected together with
enabling conditions, will have benefits for sustainable development and poverty reduction
with global warming of 1.5°C, although trade-offs are possible (high confidence). {1.4, 4.3, 4.5}
D3.1. Adaptation options that reduce the vulnerability of human and natural systems have many
synergies with sustainable development, if well managed, such as ensuring food and water security,
reducing disaster risks, improving health conditions, maintaining ecosystem services and reducing
poverty and inequality (high confidence). Increasing investment in physical and social infrastructure
is a key enabling condition to enhance the resilience and the adaptive capacities of societies. These
benefits can occur in most regions with adaptation to 1.5°C of global warming (high confidence).
{1.4.3, 4.2.2, 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.3.5, 4.4.1, 4.4.3, 4.5.3, 5.3.1, 5.3.2}
D3.2. Adaptation to 1.5°C global warming can also result in trade–offs or maladaptations with
adverse impacts for sustainable development. For example, if poorly designed or implemented,
adaptation projects in a range of sectors can increase greenhouse gas emissions and water use,
increase gender and social inequality, undermine health conditions, and encroach on natural
ecosystems (high confidence). These trade-offs can be reduced by adaptations that include attention
to poverty and sustainable development (high confidence). {4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.5.4, 5.3.2; Cross-Chapter
Boxes 6 and 7 in Chapter 3}
D3.3. A mix of adaptation and mitigation options to limit global warming to 1.5°C, implemented in
a participatory and integrated manner, can enable rapid, systemic transitions in urban and rural areas
(high confidence). These are most effective when aligned with economic and sustainable
development, and when local and regional governments and decision makers are supported by
national governments (medium confidence) {4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.4.1, 4.4.2}
D3.4. Adaptation options that also mitigate emissions can provide synergies and cost savings in
most sectors and system transitions, such as when land management reduces emissions and disaster
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risk, or when low carbon buildings are also designed for efficient cooling. Trade-offs between
mitigation and adaptation, when limiting global warming to 1.5°C, such as when bioenergy crops,
reforestation or afforestation encroach on land needed for agricultural adaptation, can undermine
food security, livelihoods, ecosystem functions and services and other aspects of sustainable
development. (high confidence) {3.4.3, 4.3.2, 4.3.4, 4.4.1, 4.5.2, 4.5.3, 4.5.4}
D4. Mitigation options consistent with 1.5°C pathways are associated with multiple synergies
and trade-offs across the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). While the total number of
possible synergies exceeds the number of trade-offs, their net effect will depend on the pace
and magnitude of changes, the composition of the mitigation portfolio and the management of
the transition. (high confidence) (Figure SPM.4) {2.5, 4.5, 5.4}
D4.1. 1.5°C pathways have robust synergies particularly for the SDGs 3 (health), 7 (clean energy),
11 (cities and communities), 12 (responsible consumption and production), and 14 (oceans) (very
high confidence). Some 1.5°C pathways show potential trade-offs with mitigation for SDGs 1
(poverty), 2 (hunger), 6 (water), and 7 (energy access), if not carefully managed (high confidence)
(Figure SPM.4). {5.4.2; Figure 5.4, Cross-Chapter Boxes 7 and 8 in Chapter 3}
D4.2. 1.5°C pathways that include low energy demand (e.g., see P1 in Figure SPM.3a and SPM.3b),
low material consumption, and low GHG-intensive food consumption have the most pronounced
synergies and the lowest number of trade-offs with respect to sustainable development and the
SDGs (high confidence). Such pathways would reduce dependence on CDR. In modelled pathways
sustainable development, eradicating poverty and reducing inequality can support limiting warming
to 1.5◦C. (high confidence) (Figure SPM.3b, Figure SPM.4) {2.4.3, 2.5.1, 2.5.3, Figure 2.4, Figure
2.28, 5.4.1, 5.4.2, Figure 5.4}
D4.3. 1.5°C and 2°C modelled pathways often rely on the deployment of large-scale land-related
measures like afforestation and bioenergy supply, which, if poorly managed, can compete with food
production and hence raise food security concerns (high confidence). The impacts of carbon dioxide
removal (CDR) options on SDGs depend on the type of options and the scale of deployment (high
confidence). If poorly implemented, CDR options such as BECCS and AFOLU options would lead
to trade-offs. Context-relevant design and implementation requires considering people’s needs,
biodiversity, and other sustainable development dimensions (very high confidence). {Figure SPM.4,
5.4.1.3, Cross-Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 3}
D4.4. Mitigation consistent with 1.5°C pathways creates risks for sustainable development in
regions with high dependency on fossil fuels for revenue and employment generation (high
confidence). Policies that promote diversification of the economy and the energy sector can address
the associated challenges (high confidence). {5.4.1.2, Box 5.2}
D4.5. Redistributive policies across sectors and populations that shield the poor and vulnerable can
resolve trade-offs for a range of SDGs, particularly hunger, poverty and energy access. Investment
needs for such complementary policies are only a small fraction of the overall mitigation
investments in 1.5°C pathways. (high confidence) {2.4.3, 5.4.2, Figure 5.5}
Indicative linkages between mitigation options and sustainable
development using SDGs (The linkages do not show costs and benefits)
Mitigation options deployed in each sector can be associated with potential positive effects (synergies) or
negative effects (trade-offs) with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The degree to which this
potential is realized will depend on the selected portfolio of mitigation options, mitigation policy design,
and local circumstances and context. Particularly in the energy-demand sector, the potential for synergies is
larger than for trade-offs. The bars group individually assessed options by level of confidence and take into
account the relative strength of the assessed mitigation-SDG connections.
The overall size of the coloured bars depict the relative for
synergies and trade-offs between the sectoral mitigation
options and the SDGs.
Length shows strength of connection
Energy-supply Land
Trade-offs Synergies Trade-offs Synergies Trade-offs Synergies
The shades depict the level of confidence of the
assessed potential for Trade-offs/Synergies.
Very High Low
Shades show level of confidence
Energy-demand
SDG1No Poverty
SDG2Zero Hunger
SDG 3Good Healthand Well-being
SDG 4QualityEducation
SDG 5GenderEquality
SDG 6Clean Waterand Sanitation
SDG 7Affordable andClean Energy
SDG 8Decent Workand EconomicGrowth
SDG 9Industry,Innovation andInfrastructure
SDG 10ReducedInequality
SDG 11SustainableCities andCommunities
SDG 12ResponsibleConsumptionand Production
SDG 14Life BelowWater
SDG 15Life on Land
SDG 16Peace andJustice StrongInstitutions
SDG 17Partnerships for the Goals
PARTNERSHIPS
FOR THE GOALS
PEACE, JUSTICEAND STRONGINSTITUTIONS
LIFE
ON LAND
LIFE
BELOW WATER
RESPONSIBLE
CONSUMPTION
AND PRODUCTION
SUSTAINABLE CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
DECENT WORK AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH
INDUSTRY, INNOVATIONAND INFRASTRUCTURE
REDUCEDINEQUALITIES
AFFORDABLE AND
CLEAN ENERGY
CLEAN WATER
AND SANITATION
GENDEREQUALITY
QUALITY
EDUCATION
GOOD HEALTHAND WELL-BEING
NO
POVERTY
ZERO
HUNGER
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Figure SPM.4: Potential synergies and trade-offs between the sectoral portfolio of climate change
mitigation options and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs serve as an
analytical framework for the assessment of the different sustainable development dimensions,
which extend beyond the time frame of the 2030 SDG targets. The assessment is based on literature
on mitigation options that are considered relevant for 1.5ºC. The assessed strength of the SDG
interactions is based on the qualitative and quantitative assessment of individual mitigation options
listed in Table 5.2. For each mitigation option, the strength of the SDG-connection as well as the
associated confidence of the underlying literature (shades of green and red) was assessed. The
strength of positive connections (synergies) and negative connections (trade-offs) across all
individual options within a sector (see Table 5.2) are aggregated into sectoral potentials for the
whole mitigation portfolio. The (white) areas outside the bars, which indicate no interactions, have
low confidence due to the uncertainty and limited number of studies exploring indirect effects. The
strength of the connection considers only the effect of mitigation and does not include benefits of
avoided impacts. SDG 13 (climate action) is not listed because mitigation is being considered in
terms of interactions with SDGs and not vice versa. The bars denote the strength of the connection,
and do not consider the strength of the impact on the SDGs. The energy demand sector comprises
behavioural responses, fuel switching and efficiency options in the transport, industry and building
sector as well as carbon capture options in the industry sector. Options assessed in the energy
supply sector comprise biomass and non-biomass renewables, nuclear, CCS with bio-energy, and
CCS with fossil fuels. Options in the land sector comprise agricultural and forest options,
sustainable diets & reduced food waste, soil sequestration, livestock & manure management,
reduced deforestation, afforestation & reforestation, responsible sourcing. In addition to this figure,
options in the ocean sector are discussed in the underlying report. {5.4, Table 5.2, Figure 5.2}
Statement for knowledge gap:
Information about the net impacts of mitigation on sustainable development in 1.5°C pathways is
available only for a limited number of SDGs and mitigation options. Only a limited number of
studies have assessed the benefits of avoided climate change impacts of 1.5°C pathways for the
SDGs, and the co-effects of adaptation for mitigation and the SDGs. The assessment of the
indicative mitigation potentials in Figure SPM.4 is a step further from AR5 towards a more
comprehensive and integrated assessment in the future.
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D5. Limiting the risks from global warming of 1.5°C in the context of sustainable
development and poverty eradication implies system transitions that can be enabled by an
increase of adaptation and mitigation investments, policy instruments, the acceleration of
technological innovation and behaviour changes (high confidence). {2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 3.2, 4.2, 4.4,
4.5, 5.2, 5.5, 5.6}
D5.1. Directing finance towards investment in infrastructure for mitigation and adaptation could
provide additional resources. This could involve the mobilization of private funds by institutional
investors, asset managers and development or investment banks, as well as the provision of public
funds. Government policies that lower the risk of low-emission and adaptation investments can
facilitate the mobilization of private funds and enhance the effectiveness of other public policies.
Studies indicate a number of challenges including access to finance and mobilisation of funds (high
confidence) {2.5.2, 4.4.5}
D5.2. Adaptation finance consistent with global warming of 1.5°C is difficult to quantify and
compare with 2°C. Knowledge gaps include insufficient data to calculate specific climate
resilience-enhancing investments, from the provision of currently underinvested basic
infrastructure. Estimates of the costs of adaptation might be lower at global warming of 1.5°C than
for 2°C. Adaptation needs have typically been supported by public sector sources such as national
and subnational government budgets, and in developing countries together with support from
development assistance, multilateral development banks, and UNFCCC channels (medium
confidence). More recently there is a growing understanding of the scale and increase in NGO and
private funding in some regions (medium confidence). Barriers include the scale of adaptation
financing, limited capacity and access to adaptation finance (medium confidence).{4.4.5, 4.6}
D5.3. Global model pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C are projected to involve the annual
average investment needs in the energy system of around 2.4 trillion USD2010 between 2016 and
2035 representing about 2.5% of the world GDP (medium confidence). {2.5.2, 4.4.5, Box 4.8}
D5.4. Policy tools can help mobilise incremental resources, including through shifting global
investments and savings and through market and non-market based instruments as well as
accompanying measures to secure the equity of the transition, acknowledging the challenges
related with implementation including those of energy costs, depreciation of assets and impacts on
international competition, and utilizing the opportunities to maximize co-benefits (high confidence)
{1.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.3.5, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 3 and 11 in Chapter 4, 4.4.5,
5.5.2}
D5.5. The systems transitions consistent with adapting to and limiting global warming to 1.5°C
include the widespread adoption of new and possibly disruptive technologies and practices and
enhanced climate-driven innovation. These imply enhanced technological innovation capabilities,
including in industry and finance. Both national innovation policies and international cooperation
can contribute to the development, commercialization and widespread adoption of mitigation and
adaptation technologies. Innovation policies may be more effective when they combine public
support for research and development with policy mixes that provide incentives for technology
diffusion. (high confidence) {4.4.4, 4.4.5}.
D5.6. Education, information, and community approaches, including those that are informed by
Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge, can accelerate the wide scale behaviour changes
consistent with adapting to and limiting global warming to 1.5°C. These approaches are more
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effective when combined with other policies and tailored to the motivations, capabilities, and
resources of specific actors and contexts (high confidence). Public acceptability can enable or
inhibit the implementation of policies and measures to limit global warming to 1.5°C and to adapt
to the consequences. Public acceptability depends on the individual’s evaluation of expected policy
consequences, the perceived fairness of the distribution of these consequences, and perceived
fairness of decision procedures (high confidence). {1.1, 1.5, 4.3.5, 4.4.1, 4.4.3, Box 4.3, 5.5.3,
5.6.5}
D6. Sustainable development supports, and often enables, the fundamental societal and
systems transitions and transformations that help limit global warming to 1.5°C. Such
changes facilitate the pursuit of climate-resilient development pathways that achieve
ambitious mitigation and adaptation in conjunction with poverty eradication and efforts to
reduce inequalities (high confidence). {Box 1.1, 1.4.3, Figure 5.1, 5.5.3, Box 5.3}
D6.1. Social justice and equity are core aspects of climate-resilient development pathways that aim
to limit global warming to 1.5°C as they address challenges and inevitable trade-offs, widen
opportunities, and ensure that options, visions, and values are deliberated, between and within
countries and communities, without making the poor and disadvantaged worse off (high
confidence). {5.5.2, 5.5.3, Box 5.3, Figure 5.1, Figure 5.6, Cross-Chapter Boxes 12 and 13 in
Chapter 5}
D6.2. The potential for climate-resilient development pathways differs between and within regions
and nations, due to different development contexts and systemic vulnerabilities (very high
confidence). Efforts along such pathways to date have been limited (medium confidence) and
enhanced efforts would involve strengthened and timely action from all countries and non-state
actors (high confidence). {5.5.1, 5.5.3, Figure 5.1}
D6.3. Pathways that are consistent with sustainable development show fewer mitigation and
adaptation challenges and are associated with lower mitigation costs. The large majority of
modelling studies could not construct pathways characterized by lack of international cooperation,
inequality and poverty that were able to limit global warming to 1.5°C. (high confidence) {2.3.1,
2.5.3, 5.5.2}
D7. Strengthening the capacities for climate action of national and sub-national authorities,
civil society, the private sector, indigenous peoples and local communities can support the
implementation of ambitious actions implied by limiting global warming to 1.5°C (high
confidence). International cooperation can provide an enabling environment for this to be
achieved in all countries and for all people, in the context of sustainable development.
International cooperation is a critical enabler for developing countries and vulnerable regions
(high confidence). {1.4, 2.3, 2.5, 4.2, 4.4, 4.5, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5, Box 4.1, Box 4.2, Box 4.7, Box
5.3, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, Cross-Chapter Box 13 in Chapter 5}
D7.1. Partnerships involving non-state public and private actors, institutional investors, the banking
system, civil society and scientific institutions would facilitate actions and responses consistent with
limiting global warming to 1.5°C (very high confidence). {1.4, 4.4.1, 4.2.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.5, 4.5.3, 5.4.1,
5.6.2, Box 5.3}.
D7.2. Cooperation on strengthened accountable multilevel governance that includes non-state actors
such as industry, civil society and scientific institutions, coordinated sectoral and cross-sectoral
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policies at various governance levels, gender-sensitive policies, finance including innovative
financing and cooperation on technology development and transfer can ensure participation,
transparency, capacity building, and learning among different players (high confidence). {2.5.2,
4.2.2, 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.4, 4.5.3, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4, 5.3.1, 4.4.5, 5.5.3, Cross-
Chapter Box 13 in Chapter 5, 5.6.1, 5.6.3}
D7.3. International cooperation is a critical enabler for developing countries and vulnerable regions
to strengthen their action for the implementation of 1.5°C-consistent climate responses, including
through enhancing access to finance and technology and enhancing domestic capacities, taking into
account national and local circumstances and needs (high confidence). {2.3.1, 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.4,
4.4.5, 5.4.1 5.5.3, 5.6.1, Box 4.1, Box 4.2, Box 4.7}.
D7.4. Collective efforts at all levels, in ways that reflect different circumstances and capabilities, in
the pursuit of limiting global warming to 1.5oC, taking into account equity as well as effectiveness,
can facilitate strengthening the global response to climate change, achieving sustainable
development and eradicating poverty (high confidence). {1.4.2, 2.3.1, 2.5.2, 4.2.2, 4.4.1, 4.4.2,
4.4.3, 4.4.4, 4.4.5, 4.5.3, 5.3.1, 5.4.1, 5.5.3, 5.6.1, 5.6.2, 5.6.3}
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Box SPM 1: Core Concepts Central to this Special Report
Global mean surface temperature (GMST): Estimated global average of near-surface air
temperatures over land and sea-ice, and sea surface temperatures over ice-free ocean regions, with
changes normally expressed as departures from a value over a specified reference period.
When estimating changes in GMST, near-surface air temperature over both land and oceans are also
used.19{1.2.1.1}
Pre-industrial: The multi-century period prior to the onset of large-scale industrial activity around
1750. The reference period 1850–1900 is used to approximate pre-industrial GMST. {1.2.1.2}
Global warming: The estimated increase in GMST averaged over a 30-year period, or the 30-year
period centered on a particular year or decade, expressed relative to pre-industrial levels unless
otherwise specified. For 30-year periods that span past and future years, the current multi-decadal
warming trend is assumed to continue. {1.2.1}
Net zero CO2 emissions: Net-zero carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are achieved when anthropogenic
CO2 emissions are balanced globally by anthropogenic CO2 removals over a specified period.
Carbon dioxide removal (CDR): Anthropogenic activities removing CO2 from the atmosphere
and durably storing it in geological, terrestrial, or ocean reservoirs, or in products. It includes
existing and potential anthropogenic enhancement of biological or geochemical sinks and direct air
capture and storage, but excludes natural CO2 uptake not directly caused by human activities.
Total carbon budget: Estimated cumulative net global anthropogenic CO2 emissions from the
preindustrial period to the time that anthropogenic CO2 emissions reach net zero that would result, at
some probability, in limiting global warming to a given level, accounting for the impact of other
anthropogenic emissions. {2.2.2}
Remaining carbon budget: Estimated cumulative net global anthropogenic CO2 emissions from a
given start date to the time that anthropogenic CO2 emissions reach net zero that would result, at some
probability, in limiting global warming to a given level, accounting for the impact of other
anthropogenic emissions. {2.2.2}
Temperature overshoot: The temporary exceedance of a specified level of global warming.
Emission pathways: In this Summary for Policymakers, the modelled trajectories of global
anthropogenic emissions over the 21st century are termed emission pathways. Emission pathways
are classified by their temperature trajectory over the 21st century: pathways giving at least 50%
probability based on current knowledge of limiting global warming to below 1.5°C are classified as
‘no overshoot’; those limiting warming to below 1.6°C and returning to 1.5°C by 2100 are
classified as ‘1.5°C limited-overshoot’; while those exceeding 1.6°C but still returning to 1.5°C by
2100 are classified as ‘higher-overshoot’.
19 Past IPCC reports, reflecting the literature, have used a variety of approximately equivalent metrics of GMST change.
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Impacts: Effects of climate change on human and natural systems. Impacts can have beneficial or
adverse outcomes for livelihoods, health and well-being, ecosystems and species, services,
infrastructure, and economic, social and cultural assets.
Risk: The potential for adverse consequences from a climate-related hazard for human and
natural systems, resulting from the interactions between the hazard and the vulnerability and
exposure of the affected system. Risk integrates the likelihood of exposure to a hazard and the
magnitude of its impact. Risk also can describe the potential for adverse consequences of adaptation
or mitigation responses to climate change.
Climate-resilient development pathways (CRDPs): Trajectories that strengthen sustainable
development at multiple scales and efforts to eradicate poverty through equitable societal and
systems transitions and transformations while reducing the threat of climate change through
ambitious mitigation, adaptation, and climate resilience.