LTC 164-2003 CITY OF MIAMI BEACH
Office of the City Manager
Letter to Commission No.
To:
From:
Subject:
Mayor David Dermer and
Members of the City Commission _
Jorge M. Gonzalez [~ . ,~--~'~
City Manager ~//
BURT J. HARRIS ACT
Date: July 16, 2003
The purpose of this LTC is to inform the Mayor and City Commission of the ruling by the
Third District Court of Appeal against the City of Miami Beach on July 16, 2003, in the
matter of Royal World Metropolitan, Inc. v. The City of Miami Beach. The Court ordered
that "the Order granting Final Summary Judgment should be reversed and the matter
remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion."
A copy of the decision is attached. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact
me.
Attachment (1)
JMG\CI~kc
C:
Murray Dubbin, City Attorney
Christina M. Cuervo, Assistant City Manager
Kevin Crowder, Economic Development Division Director
Jorge Gomez, Planning Director
C:\Documents and Settings\ddhpcrok\My Documents~BJH LTC Appeal.doc
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES
TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND,
IF FILED, DISPOSED OF.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
THIRD DISTRICT
JULY TERM, 2003
ROYAL WORLD METROPOLITAN,
INC.,
VS.
Appellant,
THE CITY OF MIAMI BEACH,
Appellee.
CASE NO. 3D02-3161
LOWER
TRIBUNAL NO. 99-17243-CA-23
Opinion filed July 16, 2003.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dade County, Amy Steele
Donner, Judge.
Brigham Moore and Amy Brigham Boulris; Hopping Green & Sams
and Gary K. Hunter, Jr. and D. Kent Safriet (Tallahassee), for
appellant.
Boies, Schiller & Flexner and Jennifer G. Altman and
Patricia Melville; Murray Dubbin, City Attorney, and Robert Dixon
and Deborah J. Turner, Assistant City Attorneys, for appellee.
Pacific Legal Foundation and Frank A. Shepherd, as Amicus
Curiae for appellant.
Before LEVY, RAMIREZ and WELLS, JJ.
LEVY, Judge.
Royal World Metropolitan, Inc. ("Royal World") brought suit
against the City of Miami Beach ("the City") pursuant to The Bert
J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act ("the Harris
Act" or "the Act"), Section 70.001, Florida Statutes, contending
that the City's newly-adopted ordinances had the effect of denying
Royal World all economically viable use of its property. The City
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that Royal World could
not maintain the action in light of Section 13 of the Act which
provides: "This section does not affect the sovereign immunity of
government." §70.001 (13), Fla. Stat. (1999). The trial court
agreed with the City and granted Final Summary Judgment. We
reverse.
Legislative intent is the polestar that guides the court's
statutory construction analysis. Reynolds v. State, 842 So. 2d 46,
49 (Fla. 2002); State v. J.M., 824 So. 2d 105, 109 (Fla. 2002). To
this end, a statute should be construed and applied to give effect
to the legislative intent, regardless of whether such construction
varies from the statute's literal meaning. Deason v. Florida
Department of Corrections, 705 So. 2d 1374, 1375 (Fla. 1998); see
also Department of Environmental Protection v. Millender, 666 So.
2d 882, 885-886 (Fla. 1996) (quoting Plante v. Smathers, 372 So.
2d 933, 936 (Fla. 1979) "Intent is traditionally discerned from
historical precedent, from the present facts, from common sense,
and from an examination of the purpose the provision was intended
to accomplish and the evils sought to be prevented.").
Rules of construction also require that courts look for a
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reason to uphold the acts of the legislature and adopt a reasonable
view that will do so. Department of Leqal Affairs v. Roqers, 329
So. 2d 257, 263 (Fla. 1976). Thus, if a statute is fairly
susceptible of two constructions, one of which will give effect to
it, and the other which will defeat it, the former construction is
preferred. See Id. Similarly, when conflicting provisions, that
cannot be reconciled, exist within the same statute, the most
recent expression contained in the statute normally prevails, but
if the last expression in one section is plainly inconsistent with
preceding sections which conform to the legislature's obvious
policy and intent, the later section must be construed as to give
it effect consistent with such other sections and the policy they
indicate. Sharer v. Hotel Corp. of America, 144 So. 2d 813, 816-817
(Fla. 1962); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rush, 777 So. 2d 1027, 1033 (Fla.
4th DCA 2000); Jordan v. Food Lion, Inc., 670 So.2d 138, 140 (Fla.
1st DCA 1996); Millender, 666 So. 2d at 886.
In the instant case, the legislative intent of the Harris Act
is evident within the first section of the Act which clearly
provides that the statute was intended to protect private property
interests against "inordinately burdensome" governmental
regulation, which do not necessarily amount to a constitutional
taking. ~ 70.001(1), Fla. Stat. (1999).
The Legislature recognizes that some laws, regulations,
and ordinances of the state and political entities in the
state, as applied, may inordinately burden, restrict, or
limit private property rights without amounting to a
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taking under the State Constitution or the United States
Constitution. The Leqislature determines that there is
an important state interest in protectinq the interests
of private property owners from such inordinate burdens.
Therefore, it is the intent of the Leqislature that, as
a separate and distinct cause of action from the law of
takinqs, the Leqislature herein provides for relief, or
payment of compensation, when a new law, rule,
regulation, or ordinance of the state or a political
entity in the state, as applied, unfairly affects real
property.
§70.001(1), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis added).
A literal reading of Section 13, as advocated by the City, is
in direct contravention of the statute and its purpose. In sum,
this literal reading of Section 13 negates everything the
legislature purports to achieve through the enactment of the Act.
See Sharer, 144 So. 2d at 817.
In Jones v. Brummer, 766 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), this
Court considered a similar argument. In Jones, the
Appellant/Employee brought suit against her Employer, the Public
Defender, under Florida's Civil Rights Act. Her discrimination
Complaint was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that the
Public Defender was immune from suit. On appeal, this Court
reversed. The Court considered the legislature's inclusion of ~the
state; or any governmental entity or agency' within the definition
of a 'person' who may be an 'employer' subject to civil liability
for unlawful employment practices under the Act." Jones, 766 So. 2d
at 1108. Additionally, the Court looked to other sections within
the Act that referred to governmental entities, and an additional
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subsection which cross-referenced a limitation on governmental
liability. See Jones, 766 So. 2d at 1108.
We conclude[d] that the statutory provisions .... read
together, evidence legislative intent that civil actions
for damages under Florid's Civil Rights Act be prosecuted
against the state, its agencies or subdivisions. If the
legislature had not intended that civil actions for
damages be prosecuted in such a manner, there would be no
reason for the inclusion of such public entities within
the definition of employer ....
Jones, 766 So. 2d at 1109.
Similarly, in the instant case, we find that a fair reading of
Section 70.001(1), Florida Statutes, evinces a sufficiently clear
legislative intent to waive sovereign immunity as to a private
property owner whose property rights are inordinately burdened,
restricted, or limited by government actions where the governmental
regulation does not rise to the level of a taking under the Florida
and United States Constitutions.~ See Jones, 766 So. 2d at 1108. A
literal reading of Section 13 is inconsistent with the clear intent
and purpose of the Act, as it would be absurd to interpret Section
13 to undo everything the Act is designed to achieve. Since it is
impossible under the appropriate rules of statutory construction to
give Section 13 literal effect within the meaning of the statute,
its application must construed consistent with the general purpose
and intent of the Act. See State ex rel. City of Casselberr¥ v.
Maqer, 356 So.2d 267, 268-69 (Fla. 1978); see also Seminole County
~ The constitutionality of the Harris Act was not raised as
an issue in this case and we express no views thereon.
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v. City of Lake Mary, 347 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). We
therefore hold that Section 13 does not bar a private property
rights claim pursuant to the Harris Act, but merely preserves the
sovereign immunity benefits the City in the instant case, and
governmental entities in general, otherwise enjoy.
In light of the clear intent of the statute and the pertinent
rules of statutory construction, the trial court erred in
construing Section 70.001(13), Florida Statutes, to bar a cause of
action against a governmental agency. Accordingly, the Order
granting Final Summary Judgment should be reversed and the matter
remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court's
opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
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