LTC 188-2024 Improper Dismissal - City v. VIctor GuytonMIAMI BEACH
OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY
L TC No. _
LETTER TO COMMISSION
TO: Honorable Mayor Steven Meiner and Members of the City Commission
FROM: Ricardo J. Dopico, City Attorney ®
DATE: May 17, 2024
SUBJECT: Court Victory in City of Miami Beach v. Victor Guyton; Case No. 3D22-1875
The purpose of this Letter to Commission (L TC) is to advise you of Wednesday's victory in the
Third District Court of Appeal, in the case styled City of Miami Beach v. Victor Guyton, No. 3022-
1875. As you are aware, the City Attorney's Office, through its Municipal Prosecution Team,
prosecutes defendants solely charged with violating the City's criminal ordinances. Before the
creation of the Municipal Prosecution Team, most of these defendants would not have faced
charges.
In this case, the trial court dismissed the City's criminal case against Victor Guyton, who was
charged with Urinating in Public, which is a violation of section 70-42 of the City of Miami Beach
Code of Laws and Ordinances. The City asserted that the trial court had no legal authority to
dismiss the case against Guyton, and that doing so constituted an improper infringement upon
the discretion of the City to prosecute its cases in the manner it deems appropriate.
The City's sole recourse to address the trial court's erroneous dismissal of the City's case was an
appeal to the Third District Court of Appeal. The Third District Court of Appeal agreed with the
City and the Attorney General and issued an unequivocal ruling that the trial court lacked the legal
authority to dismiss the case. The Court of Appeal, therefore, reversed the order of dismissal and
remanded the case back to the County Court for further proceedings, thereby enabling the
Municipal Prosecution Team to pursue the charges. This victory established an important
precedent for the City as well as any other Florida municipalities that may in the future decide to
implement a similar municipal prosecution model in their jurisdictions.
The Municipal Prosecution Team continues to vigorously prosecute defendants arrested by the
Miami Beach Police Department and charged with violating the City's criminal ordinances in order
to address the quality-of-life issues associated with these offenses. The City Attorney's Office, in
conjunction with the Attorney General's Office, will continue to seek appellate relief from improper
rulings by the trial courts.
A copy of the Third District Court of Appeal's May 15, 2024 opinion is attached. We are pleased
to continue to make positive strides in fighting for and improving the health, welfare and safety of
the City's residents and visitors.
As always, please feel free to contact Rob Rosenwald, Mark Fishman or me for further information
about this or any matter related to the City's Municipal Prosecution Team.
RJD/MF/bs
We are committed to providing excellent public service and safety to o/1 who live, work, and play in our vibrant, tropical, historic community.
188-2024
@h ir District ourt of @ppeal
State of flora
Opinion filed May 15, 2024.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
No. 3022-1875
Lower Tribunal No. 822-20916
City of Miami Beach,
Appellant,
vs.
Victor Guyton,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Michael G.
Barket, Judge.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Ivy R. Ginsberg, Assistant
Attorney General; Ricardo J. Dopico, City Attorney, City of Miami Beach, and
Robert F. Rosenwald, Jr., Chief Deputy City Attorney, and Woody Clermont,
Assistant City Attorney, for appellant.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Andrew Stanton, Assistant
Public Defender, for appellee.
Before EMAS, LOBREE and BOKOR, JJ.
EMAS, J.
The City of Miami Beach appeals from a trial court order dismissing a
criminal charge against Victor Guyton for urinating in public, a violation of
section 70-42 of the City of Miami Beach Code of Laws and Ordinances.
Because the trial court did not have the authority to dismiss the charge under
the circumstances presented, we reverse the order of dismissal and remand
the case for further proceedings.
The relevant facts are not in dispute: Guyton was arrested and taken
into custody on Friday, October 21, 2022, and charged by arrest affidavit with
urinating in public. Guyton remained in custody, and his first appearance
hearing was held the following day (Saturday, October 22). When Guyton's
case was called, the municipal prosecutor was not present, and there is no
evidence in the record that the City received notice of the proceeding. The
assistant public defender moved for dismissal based on the municipal
prosecutor's absence from the proceeding, positing that if his client (i.e., the
defendant) was not present in court, the court would issue a bench warrant.
The first appearance judge announced he was granting the motion and
entered a dismissal of the charge. The trial court stamped the arrest affidavit
"DISMISSED JAIL ARR."
2
The City appealed' and asserts that, under the circumstances
presented, the trial court was without authority to dismiss the charge against
Guyton, and that doing so "constituted an improper infringement upon the
State's discretion to prosecute." State v. Leon, 967 So. 2d 437, 437 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2007). See also State v. Brosky, 79 So. 3d 134, 135 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)
(reiterating that "in the absence of a statute or a proper motion to dismiss,
the decision whether to prosecute or to dismiss charges is a determination
to be made solely by the State"); State v. Bonnett, 985 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2008) (finding dismissal of charges as sanction for prosecutor's
behavior was reversible error); State v. L.E., 754 So. 2d 60, 61 (Fla. 3d DCA
2000) ("This court has repeatedly stated that the dismissal of criminal
charges is an extreme sanction reserved solely for those instances where no
feasible alternative exists. The reason that dismissal of criminal charges
should be utilized as a last resort is that this sanction punishes the public not
the state or the witness who fails to appear, and results in a windfall to the
appellee.")
1 The City filed a notice of appeal on October 28, 2022, and thereafter a
motion to relinquish jurisdiction to the trial court for rendition of a written
order. This court granted the motion, and a written order was rendered on
March 15, 2023, nunc pro tune to October 22, 2022.
3
On appeal, Guyton does not contest the law on this issue, but argues
the error was not preserved because the City failed to raise an objection to
dismissal in the trial court during the relinquishment period, instead sending
the trial court a proposed order of dismissal to allow the appeal to proceed.
Given the narrow scope of our relinquishment order however, 2 the City did
precisely what it was authorized to do (obtain a written order of dismissal
from the trial court) and could not lodge an objection to (or seek rehearing
of) the trial court's oral pronouncement dismissing the charge against
Guyton. See Ward v. State, 405 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (the filing
of a notice of appeal from a final order vests exclusive jurisdiction in the
appellate court, and a trial court is without jurisdiction to amend that final
order absent a relinquishment of jurisdiction for such a stated purpose); Fla.
R. App. P. 9.600(b) ("If the jurisdiction of the lower tribunal has been divested
by an appeal from a final order, the court by order may permit the lower
tribunal to proceed with specifically stated matters during the pendency of
the appeal.") (emphasis added); see also Yampol v. Turnberry Isle S. Condo.
Ass'n,Inc_, 137 So. 3d 1124, 1125 (Fla. 3d DCA2014) (quashing trial court
2 Our relinquishment order provided that "jurisdiction of this cause is
temporarily relinquished to the trial court for a period of thirty (30) days from
the date of this Order for the trial court to enter a written order of
dismissal." (Emphasis added.)
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order entered following appellate court's relinquishment of jurisdiction,
because the trial court's order "exceeded the express purpose of the
relinquishment" as authorized by the appellate court); Palma Sola Harbour
Condo .• Inc. v. Huber, 374 So. 2d 1135, 1138 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (holding
that a trial court order which exceeds the scope of the "specifically stated
matters" authorized by the appellate court for the trial court to consider on
relinquishment of jurisdiction is invalid).
This case is indistinguishable, both on its facts and the applicable
analysis, from our recent decision in City of Miami Beach v. Adalberto
Cosme, 49 Fla. L. Weekly D322, 2024 WL 463232 (Fla. 3d DCA February 7,
2024 ). As we held in that case, and reaffirm here, the trial court's order of
dismissal, entered without notice and an opportunity to be heard, violated
the City's due process rights. In addition, given the City's sole authority to
determine whether to proceed with the prosecution of the case, and in the
absence of a proper motion to dismiss, the trial court exceeded its authority
in dismissing the charge.
We therefore reverse the order of dismissal and remand for further
proceedings.
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City of Miami Beach v. Victor Guyton
Case No. 3D22-1875
LOBREE, J. (specially concurring)
I concur with the majority that in sua sponte dismissing the case, the
trial court improperly ruled on an issue that was not before it and interfered
with the City's discretion to bring charges against Guyton. I further concur
that this case is factually and analytically indistinguishable from our
decision in City of Miami Beach v. Cosme, 49 Fla. L. Weekly D322 (Fla. 3d
DCA Feb. 7, 2024), and thus we are compelled to reverse. However,
I agree with Judge Miller's dissenting views in Cosme that this error
should have been found to be invited or unpreserved, id. at D323-324
(Miller, J., dissenting), and at a minimum, that in reversing the case on due
process grounds, our court errs in relying on an argument advanced by the
City for the first time in the reply brief, see City of Miami Beach v. Cosme,
49 Fla. L. Weekly D908a (Fla. 3d DCA Apr. 24, 2024) (Miller, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing or clarification).
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