LTC 220-2025 Court Victory in Lawsuit Concerning Interactive Digital Media Kiosks220-2025
MIAMI BEACH
OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY
L TC No. _______ _
LETTER TO COMMISSION
TO:
FROM:
Mayor Steven Meiner and Members of the City Commission
Ricardo Dopico, City Attorney (!}I;;)
DATE: May 27, 2025
SUBJECT: Court Victory in Lawsuit Concerning Interactive Digital Media Kiosks
This letter is to advise you of the City's recent victory in obtaining dismissal with prejudice
of the lawsuit Outfront Media Group v. City of Miami Beach et al., Case No. 2024-021168-
CA-01 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct.), concerning the City's contract with IKE Smart City, LLC ("IKE")
to install, maintain and operate interactive digital media kiosks ("Kiosks") at certain
locations in the City.
The lawsuit was filed by Outfront Media Group LLC ("Outfront"), which separately has a
contract with the City for the installation, operation and maintenance of certain bus
shelters in the City, on which advertising may be placed. Outfront alleged that it is a
market competitor of IKE and sued to invalidate the contract between IKE and the City
based on Outfront's belief that the Kiosks are unauthorized by law.
After briefing and oral argument, Judge Beatrice Butchko Sanchez entered an order
dismissing Outfront's lawsuit with prejudice . The Court ruled that Outfront lacks standing
to challenge the contract between IKE and the City (to which Outfront is not a party), that
the statutes and code provisions cited by Outfront do not create any private right of action,
and that sovereign immunity bars Outfront's claims.
The City's case was litigated entirely in-house by Deputy City Attorney Henry J. Hunnefeld
and First Assistant City Attorney Freddi Mack.
A copy of the dismissal order is attached. Outfront still has the opportunity to appeal.
As always, please feel free to contact me or Rob Rosenwald for further information about
this or any City litigation matter.
RD /FM/ag
We are committed to providing excellent public service and safety to all who live, work , and play in our vibrant, tropical, historic
community.
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL
CIRCUIT IN AND FOR MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA
CASE NO: 2024-021168-CA-01
SECTION: CA22
JUDGE: Beatrice Butchko Sanchez
OUTFRONT MEDIA GROUP LLC
Plaintiff(s)
vs.
CITY OF MIAMI BEACH FLORIDA (THE) et al
Defendant(s)
____________________________/
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS
THIS CAUSE came before the Court on May 20, 2025, via Zoom, for a special set hearing on
Defendants, The City of Miami Beach (“City”) and IKE Smart City, LLC (“IKE”, collectively,
“Defendants”), Joint Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Outfront Media Group, LLC’s (“Outfront”)
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (D.E. 21) (“Motion”). The Court has considered
the arguments of counsel at the hearing, the submitted briefing, including Defendants’ Motion and
Supporting Exhibits (D.E. 21–22), Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition (D.E. 27) (“Opposition”),
and Defendants’ Joint Reply (D.E. 28) (“Reply”), the record in this case, and is otherwise fully
advised in the premises. For the reasons set forth below, and those stated on the record at the
hearing, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED, and the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice for the reasons set forth below.
BACKGROUND
The Complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to invalidate a contract (the “IKE
Contract”) between IKE and the City for the installation of electronic kiosks (the “IKE Kiosks”) in
City right-of-way locations. Outfront alleges that the IKE Contract between the City and IKE
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Filing # 223819154 E-Filed 05/23/2025 02:15:26 PM
authorized the installation of the IKE Kiosks. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 6, 29. Yet, according to Outfront, the
IKE Kiosks contemplated by the IKE Contract would be unlawful if installed. See generally
Compl. The Complaint seeks to “enjoin[] the City and IKE from performing under the [IKE
Contract]” and seeks a “[d]eclaratory Judgment determining [that the IKE Kiosks] cannot be
installed in the public right-of-way as a matter of state, county, and local law.” Compl. p.15.
Plaintiff Outfront alleges that it operates a business that competes with Defendant IKE in the
City. See Compl. ¶¶ 16–18, 23, 29. Outfront asserts that since 2021 it has been a party to a contract
with the City for the construction, installation, operation, and maintenance of bus shelters
(including advertising thereon) at designated locations within the City for a 20-year term (the
“Outfront Contract”). See Compl. ¶¶ 19–22.
Although Outfront alleges the existence of both the IKE Contract and the Outfront Contract with
the City in its Complaint, it did not attach to its Complaint a copy of either contract. In their
motion to dismiss, Defendants provided the Court with the IKE Contract, and to respond to
Outfront’s assertions in the Opposition, Defendants provided the Court with excerpts of the
Outfront Contract in the Reply. The Court is permitted to consider the terms and conditions of both
the IKE Contract and the Outfront Contract based on the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. See,
e.g., Orr v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 401 So. 3d 397 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (“Because the allegations in
the complaints incorporated the wireless customer agreement by relying on and quoting it, the trial
court properly considered the agreement while ruling on AT&T’s motion to dismiss the complaint
with prejudice”); Von Dyck v. Gavin, 350 So. 3d 842, 845 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (“[W]hen the terms
of a legal document are impliedly incorporated by reference into the complaint, the trial court may
consider the contents of the document in ruling on a motion to dismiss.” (quoting Air Quality
Assessors of Fla. v. S. Owners Ins. Co., 354 So. 3d 569, 571 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022))); One Call Prop.
Servs. Inc. v. Sec. First Ins. Co., 165 So. 3d 749, 752 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (“[I]n this case, the
complaint refers to the settlement agreement, and in fact, [Plaintiff’s] standing to bring suit is
premised on the terms of that agreement. Accordingly, since the complaint impliedly incorporates
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the terms of the agreement by reference, the trial court was entitled to review the terms of that
agreement to determine the nature of the claim being alleged.” (quoting Veal v. Voyager Prop. &
Cas. Ins. Co., 51 So. 3d 1246, 1249–50 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011))).
Outfront asserts the conclusory allegation that the IKE Kiosks give IKE an unspecified “unfair
competitive advantage” within the City. Compl. ¶ 7. Outfront seeks relief, including “enjoining the
City and IKE from performing” under the IKE Contract, thereby effectively asking the Court to
invalidate the IKE Contract. Compl. p. 15.
Outfront does not allege that it is a party to the IKE Contract, that it is a third party beneficiary
to the IKE Contract, or that it has any interest in the IKE Contract. Outfront does not allege that it
will suffer any special harm due to any of the allegations in the Complaint. Outfront does not assert
that the Outfront Contract has been breached. Outfront does not assert any constitutional challenge
in the Complaint.
I. Outfront Lacks Standing
Plaintiff Outfront lacks standing to assert its claim for declaratory and injunctive relief. In
Herbits v. City of Miami, 207 So. 3d 274 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016), the Third District Court of Appeal
held that plaintiffs who were adjacent property owners and taxpayers lacked standing to challenge a
municipal lease and associated agreements because they were neither parties to nor beneficiaries of
the IKE Contract. Because Outfront is not alleged to be a party to nor a third party beneficiary of
the IKE Contract, it “[has] no right to challenge the [contract], or to seek a declaration from the
Court that the [contract] should be terminated.” Id. at 287 (“Because these Plaintiffs and other
members of the general public are neither parties to these Agreements nor third party beneficiaries
thereunder, they have no right to challenge the Agreements, or to seek a declaration from the Court
that the Agreements should be terminated.” (quoting Sec’y Mut. Cas. Co. v. Pacura, 402 So. 2d
1266, 1267 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981))); see also First Nat’l Bank in Palm Beach v. Underwood, 499 So.
2d 60, 60 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (holding that non-party to a contract “has no standing to bring an
action for a declaratory judgment” regarding the contract).
Herbits is instructive. In Herbits, the plaintiffs alleged that the City of Miami violated its charter
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because the contract it entered into (involving a lease of property) was allegedly not for fair market
value. 207 So. 3d at 281–82. The Third District Court of Appeal rejected the plaintiffs’ claim of
standing based on their proximity to the property at issue. Id. at 282. The Court held that proximity
to the property “has not been shown to affect the seven [plaintiffs] in a manner ‘different in kind,’
not merely greater in degree,’ than it affects other residents throughout the City.” Id. Outfront’s
position as a general business competitor confers upon it less standing than the plaintiffs in
Herbits.
Additionally, Outfront lacks standing because it fails to allege a special injury, as required to
challenge government action. Under Florida law, plaintiffs “lack standing to challenge a
governmental action unless they demonstrate either a special injury, different from the injuries to
other citizens and taxpayers, or unless the claim is based on the violation of a provision of the
Constitution that governs the taxing and spending powers.” Solares v. City of Miami, 166 So. 3d
887, 888 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015).
In the instant case, Outfront has similarly failed to allege any special injury that distinguishes its
purported harm from that suffered by the general public. Indeed, the Complaint vaguely alleges that
the IKE Contract “give[s] IKE an unfair competitive advantage over companies that provide, or
seek to provide, lawful advertising services within the City,” but fails to articulate any harm to
Outfront, much less specific harm based on the installation of the IKE Kiosks. Compl. ¶ 7. Even
where “allegations establish a prima facie case for [violation of zoning ordinances by a
defendant],” the Herbits court “affirm[ed] the dismissal [of claims relating to such alleged
violation] with prejudice based on lack of special injury.” 207 So. 3d at 283. Pressed at oral
argument on the Motion to identify harm that it suffered, it became clear that the relief Outfront
sought was an advisory opinion.
In Solares, as here, the plaintiff suffered no special injury beyond those shared by the public at
large. 166 So. 3d at 888. As a result, the court concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to
challenge the City of Miami’s actions, referencing the principle articulated in Alachua County v.
Scharps, 855 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Id. at 888–89. In Scharps, the court similarly held
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that a taxpayer without a “special injury” could not challenge a governmental action unless the
complaint alleged a constitutional violation (Outfront does not assert a constitutional challenge in
the Complaint). 855 So. 2d at 198–99. Generalized grievances, unaccompanied by a particularized
harm, are insufficient to confer standing.
Outfront’s Complaint does not involve a constitutional challenge, and Plaintiff has failed to
allege any injury at all, and none can be inferred that would differ from that of the public at large.
The Herbits court held the plaintiffs’ remedies for its zoning-related complaints “should be at
the polls and not in the courts.” 207 So. 3d at 287 (quoting Paul v. Blake, 376 So. 2d 256, 259 (Fla.
3d DCA 1979)). So is the case here.
II. Outfront’s Cited Procurement Cases Do Not Apply to the Allegations Pled in the
Complaint
Plaintiff cites Accela, Inc. v. Sarasota Cnty., 901 So. 2d 237, 238 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) and
Matheson v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 258 So. 3d 516, 520 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018), for the proposition that it
has “competitor” standing to challenge a contract to which it is not a party, but those are
procurement cases where the plaintiff was prevented from participating in competitive bidding.
Here, the Complaint does not allege a procurement-based claim, nor does Outfront allege that it
was denied the opportunity to compete in a procurement matter or RFP process. Outfront does not
allege any challenge to the underlying RFP that led to the IKE Contract and does not allege a
violation of any procurement or RFP-related right, and therefore cannot rely on Accela and
Matheson to manufacture standing based on a status as an RFP-challenging competitor, where it
makes no such allegation in the Complaint. Indeed, at the oral argument on the Motion, Outfront
acknowledged that given the opportunity to bid, it declined to participate.
As explained further below, Outfront seeks a declaratory judgment regarding the IKE Contract
to indirectly achieve what it cannot do directly—private enforcement of local and state zoning law.
But Outfront’s desire to eliminate perceived market competition does not vest it with standing to
challenge the validity of the IKE Contract, in which Outfront has no direct or third-party-
beneficiary interest. The concept of “competitor” standing is not as broad as Outfront would
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suggest. Outfront is not specially aggrieved by the existence of the IKE Contract and therefore
lacks standing to lodge its challenge.
III. The Statutes and Ordinances Outfront Relies Upon Do Not Create Private Rights of
Action
Outfront seeks to obtain a court declaration to determine “whether the installation of digital
advertising kiosks in the City’s public rights-of-way is legal under state, county, and city law.”
Compl. ¶ 67. The IKE Kiosks are subject to zoning and permitting review by all governmental
authorities having jurisdiction. Compl. ¶ 39. That is, Outfront seeks to privately enforce state and
local laws, yet the statutes and ordinances it relies upon do not provide a private right of action and
reserve enforcement for the government.
This Court declines to create a private cause of action where none has been provided by the statutes
or codes at issue. City of Sarasota v. Windom, 736 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (“In the absence
of legislative intent to create a private cause of action on behalf of citizens seeking to challenge an
allegedly improper traffic control device, we decline to create such a cause of action.”). Courts
cannot simply infer that Outfront possesses an enforcement power; absent a “specific expression”
of legislative intent to vest statutory enforcement rights in private citizens, “a private right of action
may not be implied.” United Auto. Ins. Co. v. A 1st Choice Healthcare Sys., 21 So. 3d 124, 128
(Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (citing Villazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 843 So. 2d 841, 852
(Fla. 2003)).
Parties may not utilize the court system to privately enforce zoning laws to prevent competition
or otherwise keep market advantage over competitors. For example, the appellant in Michels
Belleair challenged the permits issued for a nearby shopping center. Skaggs-Albertson’s Props.,
Inc. v. Michels Belleair Bluffs Pharmacy, Inc., 332 So. 2d 113, 114 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
(hereinafter “Michels Belleair”). In reviewing the various claims purporting to establish the
appellant’s standing, the court expressly held that the appellant could not base his standing on a
potential loss of business following from the development of a competing project, which was
anticipated to include a retail drugstore, allegedly in violation of a city zoning ordinance. Id. at 116.
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Outfront alleges that the IKE Kiosks “violate” the Florida Transportation Code. See Compl. ¶¶
31–52. However, FDOT alone is vested with powers and duties under the Code, including the
power to “take any other action necessary to carry out the powers and duties expressly granted in
this Code.” § 334.044(30), Fla. Stat. Indeed, Outfront alleges that installation of the IKE Kiosks
violates Florida Statutes § 337.407, but that very statute vests the Department with authority “to
direct removal of any sign erected in violation of subsection (1).” § 337.407(2), Fla. Stat. It does
not grant private entities any enforcement rights under the statute.
Similarly, Outfront alleges that the IKE Kiosks “violate” the Florida Outdoor Advertising Code
(Chapter 479 of the Florida Statutes), see Compl. ¶¶ 32, 38–39, but that Code likewise vests the
Department with authority to “[a]dminister and enforce this chapter…including, but not limited
to…removal of nonconforming signs.” §§ 479.01(6), 479.02(1), Fla. Stat. Again, the Florida
Outdoor Advertising Code does not grant private entities any enforcement rights under the statute.
Similarly, Outfront alleges that the IKE Kiosks “violate” the Florida Outdoor Advertising Code
(Chapter 479 of the Florida Statutes), see Compl. ¶¶ 32, 38–39, but that Code likewise vests the
Department with authority to “[a]dminister and enforce this chapter…including, but not limited
to…removal of nonconforming signs.” §§ 479.01(6), 479.02(1), Fla. Stat. Again, the Florida
Outdoor Advertising Code does not grant private entities any enforcement rights under the statute.
So too with the County Sign Code (Chapter 33, Article VI of the Miami-Dade County Code of
Ordinances). That Code expressly states: “In the unincorporated areas [of Miami-Dade County],
this chapter shall be enforced by the County, and in the incorporated areas, this chapter shall be
enforced by the municipalities.” § 33-82(a)(1), County Code. Outfront thus lacks any private right
of action to enforce the alleged violation of the County Sign Code. See Compl. ¶¶ 53–57. Likewise,
nothing in either the City of Miami Beach Code of Ordinances or the City Resiliency Code (see
Compl. ¶¶ 58–62) creates a private right of action to enforce the sign-related provisions therein.
Outfront’s complaint that it has been unable to persuade the State, the County or the City to
accept its interpretation of statutes and ordinances does not give it the right to bring an action where
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no private right to do so exists.
Courts cannot be used as mechanisms to challenge local government zoning decisions to protect
existing businesses. See Michels Belleair, 332 So. 2d at 1088–89 (“The fact that [plaintiff] might
lose business because of competition from [competing] drugstore operation cannot provide the
requisite standing.”). In order to demonstrate standing, a plaintiff must allege and demonstrate that
its legally recognized property interests would be negatively impacted by the proposed change. The
interest in question must be “definite” and must be different in degree than that shared by the
community at large. Renard v. Dade Cnty., 261 So. 2d 832, 837 (Fla. 1972) (the standard applied to
zoning decisions challenges is whether the challenger has demonstrated below that it possesses a
legally recognizable interest that “is or will be affected by the action . . . in question.”).
In sum, none of the statutory or code provisions invoked by Outfront are accompanied by the
requisite legislative expression of intent to create a private right of action, and no such causes of
action exist.
IV. The Declaratory Judgment Statute Is Not a Catch-All That Creates Its Own Cause of
Action, Where No Underlying Cause of Action Exists
Outfront’s reliance on Chapter 86, Florida Statutes, as an independent basis for this action is
misplaced. The Declaratory Judgment statute is procedural in nature and does not create substantive
rights where no underlying right exists. A plaintiff must still allege a justiciable controversy
supported by a cognizable legal interest. As the Florida Supreme Court held in Bryant v. Gray, 70
So. 2d 581, 584 (Fla. 1954), the Declaratory Judgment statute does not allow courts to render
advisory opinions on abstract or hypothetical disputes. Reibel v. Rolling Green Condo. A, Inc., 311
So. 2d 156 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) (“[F]or a party to be entitled to a declaratory decree [it] must have
an actual interest in the subject matter and the relief sought should not be merely legal advice by
the courts or an answer to satisfy curiosity.”).
Outfront’s Complaint fails to allege any enforceable legal right that the Court can declare or
protect. Outfront asserts no legal right under contract, statute, or constitution. What it seeks is not
judicial clarification of its own legal status, but a court order enjoining municipal action it dislikes.
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That is not the function of Chapter 86.
V. Sovereign Immunity Bars the Entire Action
The entire action is also barred by sovereign immunity under the authority of Detournay v. City
of Coral Gables, 127 So. 3d 869 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). As the Court held in Detournay, “the courts
have no role in advising or directing a government when, if, and how to maintain an administrative
enforcement action.” 127 So. 3d 869, 874 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). But that is exactly what Outfront is
asking this Court to do.
Detournay emphasizes the separation-of-powers underpinnings of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. Id.; see also Art. II, § 3, Fla. Const.; Art. X, § 13, Fla. Const. In Detournay, the plaintiffs
sought judicial intervention to compel the City of Coral Gables to take enforcement action on an
alleged zoning violation. 127 So. 3d at 870-2. The Third District Court of Appeal unequivocally
held that “the courts have no role in advising or directing a government when, if, and how to
maintain an administrative enforcement action” and that if private citizens believe that enforcement
is proper, “they need to knock on the doors of city hall, not the courthouse.” Detournay, 127 So. 3d
at 874.
In Trianon, similar to Detournay, a private entity sued a municipality, complaining that the
municipality was not enforcing provisions of its building code enacted pursuant to its police
powers. Trianon Park Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1985). The
Florida Supreme Court explained that “the enactment of a statute giving a governmental entity the
power to enforce compliance with the law does not, in and of itself, give individuals a new right of
action that previously never existed.” Id. at 922. Thus, in Trianon, the existence of the statewide
Florida Building Code did not create “a means to guarantee the quality of buildings for individual
property owners or developers.” Id. Instead, sovereign immunity protected the municipality from
challenges to activities inherent in the course of governance, like permitting, licensing, and the
enforcement of laws and protection of the public safety. See id. at 919–20.
Outfront cannot overcome this sovereign-immunity/separation-of-powers bar by simply
couching its claims as a “declaratory judgment” count. “In Florida, sovereign immunity is the rule,
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rather than the exception . . .” Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Dep’t of Corr., 471 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla.
1984). Sovereign immunity is a bar against suit itself, not just liability. Fla. Highway Patrol v.
Jackson, 288 So. 3d 1179, 1185 (Fla. 2020) (“Outside of claims brought under the federal or state
constitutions, sovereign immunity bars suit against the State [or its subdivisions]”; and “[i]n
Florida, sovereign immunity is both an immunity from liability and an immunity from suit.”).
Courts have recognized only limited exceptions, none of which applies here: (1) tort claims under §
768.28, Fla. Stat.; (2) express statutory causes of action (e.g., the Bert J. Harris Private Property
Rights Protection Act); (3) constitutional claims; and (4) breach of express, written contracts. The
Third District Court of Appeal has reiterated this rule: “Because sovereign immunity is the rule, not
the exception, a state agency is insulated from liability absent an explicit and unambiguous
waiver.” Fla. Int’l Univ. Bd. of Trs. v. Signal Safe, Inc., 388 So. 3d 1103, 1105–06 (Fla. 3d DCA
2024) (citing City of Miami v. Robinson, 364 So. 3d 1087, 1091 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023). Thus, when
“declaratory judgment claims are not brought under the federal or state constitutions” and
exceptions do not apply, then sovereign immunity bars that declaratory judgment claim. See Univ.
of Fla. Bd. of Trs. v. Browning, 387 So. 3d 371, 376–67 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024).
Outfront’s claims do not fall within any recognized waiver of sovereign immunity. The statutes
and ordinances Outfront relies on—sections 337.407, 337.408, 479.11, 334.044, the County Sign
Code, and the City Code and Resiliency Code—do not contain any language conferring a private
right of action or waiving sovereign immunity. Applying sovereign immunity principles to the
instant case, Outfront’s claims amount to an improper attempt to mandate the City’s actions in
building and zoning enforcement matters. The court in Detournay emphasized that “the City’s
discretion to file, prosecute, abate, settle, or dismiss a building and zoning enforcement action
against [a party] is an executive function that cannot be supervised by the courts…” 127 So. 3d at
873. Similarly, Outfront’s allegations fail to identify any specific constitutional mandate that would
justify judicial intrusion into the City’s discretionary enforcement decisions.
As in Detournay, where the court refused to compel enforcement based solely on a private
party’s grievance, Outfront’s claims are an improper encroachment on the City’s executive
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authority to enter the IKE Contract and on the City Commission’s planning-level decisions
concerning the IKE Kiosks. Judicial intervention in the City’s discretionary decisions would
undermine this essential constitutional balance and violate the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
CONCLUSION
The terminal defects in Outfront’s Complaint cannot be remedied by amendment.
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Joint Motion to
Dismiss filed by Defendants The City of Miami Beach and IKE Smart City, LLC is GRANTED.
Plaintiff Outfront Media Group LLC’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers at Miami-Dade County, Florida on this 23rd day of May,
2025.
2024-021168-CA-01 05-23-2025 2:03 PM
2024-021168-CA-01 05-23-2025 2:03 PM
Hon. Beatrice Butchko Sanchez
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE
Electronically Signed
Final Order as to All Parties UCR #: CA010 (Disposed by Judge)
THE COURT DISMISSES THIS CASE AGAINST ANY PARTY NOT LISTED IN THIS FINAL
ORDER OR PREVIOUS ORDER(S). THIS CASE IS CLOSED AS TO ALL PARTIES.
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Electronically Served:
Andrew E Stearns: astearns@stearnsweaver.com•
Andrew E Stearns: wsolomon@stearnsweaver.com•
Etan Mark: etan@markmigdal.com•
Etan Mark: eservice@markmigdal.com•
Jordan Nadel: jordan@markmigdal.com•
Jordan Nadel: eservice@markmigdal.com•
Eugene E. Stearns: estearns@stearnsweaver.com•
Eugene E. Stearns: jcartwright@stearnsweaver.com•
Henry J Hunnefeld: henryhunnefeld@miamibeachfl.gov•
Henry J Hunnefeld: sandraperez@miamibeachfl.gov•
Henry J Hunnefeld: merarimotola@miamibeachfl.gov•
Freddi R. Mack: freddimack@miamibeachfl.gov•
Jenea Reed: jreed@stearnsweaver.com•
Jenea Reed: debanks@stearnsweaver.com•
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