OIG No. 25-13 Report of Inquiry Regarding Former Planning Board MemberJoseph M.Centorino,Inspector General
FINAL REPORT
TO:
FROM:
DATE:
RE:
Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Commission
Joseph M.Centorino,Inspector General
July 22,2025
Inquiry into Alleged Prohibited Gift Solicitation/Conflict of Interest Involving Former
Planning Board Member
OIG No.:25-13
Introduction
This inquiry was opened upon receipt by the Office of the Inspector General of complaints from
multiple sources regarding actions by former Miami Beach Planning Board member Matthew
Gultanoff.
One complaint centered around Mr.Gultanoff's apparent solicitation of a contribution from a
developer as a public benefit that could influence his vote.That action occurred at the January 7,
2025,meeting of the City of Miami Beach Planning Board when the board was hearing a matter
involving the continuance of two items,PB24-0703 and PB24-0698,which sought approvals for
a proposed development at 1250 West Avenue.The two pending development applications were
not voted upon at that meeting,only their continuance to a future meeting of the board.
The second issue raised concerned whether Mr.Gultanoff,who is employed by the Miami Design
Preservation League (MDPL)as Special Projects and Grants Manager,had a prohibited conflict
of interest in serving on the Planning Board,a land use board with quasi-judicial powers,when
his former supervisor at the MDPL,Daniel Giraldo appeared before the Planning Board to
advocate on behalf of the MDPL.
A third issue was raised regarding whether Mr.Gultanoff met the qualification requirements under
City Code to serve on the Planning Board.
During the inquiry,the OIG conducted interviews of Miami Beach City Planner Thomas Mooney,
Chief Deputy City Attorney Nick Kallergis,and Attorneys Nick Rodriguez and Michael Larkin,
representing the developer,Daniel Giraldo,and Matthew Gultanoff.The OIG also consulted Radia
Turay,Advocate for the Miami-Dade Commission on Ethics and Public Trust,and Timothy
Vandergiesen,Chief of the Public Corruption Division for the Miami-Dade County State Attorney's
Office.In addition,the OIG reviewed the recording of the Planning Board meeting that occurred
on January 7,at which the apparent gift solicitation occurred.
Page 1 of 7
Following his discussion with the Inspector General,Mr.Kallergis sought and received an opinion
from the State of Florida Commission on Ethics regarding ethical issues raised by the inquiry,
which is attached to this report.
Subsequent to the initiation of this inquiry,Mr.Gultanoff's term on the Planning Board expired,
and he no longer serves as a member of that board.
OIG Factual Summary
Review of Recording of January 7 Planning Board Meeting
The OIG reviewed the recording of the Planning Board meeting at which P24-0703,1250 West
Avenue-Alton Beach Bayfront Overlay District Comprehensive Plan Amendment and PB24-0698,
1250 West Avenue-Development Regulations for the Alton Beach Bayfront Overlay District were
both on the agenda.The items were called early in the meeting for the sole purpose of continuing
them to a subsequent meeting.Following a brief update provided by Attorney Rodriguez on the
project in connection with a request for the continuance of the items,the chair noted that following
a public meeting on the project he was aware that it was "in the spotlight."The floor was opened
for public comment,but there were no comments from the public either in person or on Zoom.
In response to an invitation by the chair for comments from the board members,Mr.Gultanoff
made a reference to the prior community meeting on the project where he said that the comments
"were overwhelmingly not positive"on the project,citing concerns over the height of the project,
the unit sizes,and the impact on the community.Mr.Rodriguez responded that there were
possible changes being contemplated on the size of the project as well on the public benefits to
be provided by the developer to address the concerns raised at the community meeting,as well
as those raised by elected officials and by the members of the Planning Board.
Mr.Gultanoff responded that,"Since you are making changes,a suggestion that I would make,
or just a suggestion that I'll float,in addition to a pocket park perhaps or a parking garage,which
didn't seem to have much support or perhaps need,how about a contribution to a South Beach
Mobility Fund to help with funding bicycle/pedestrian Master Plan projects that have been stalled
for many years,micro-mobility and other sorts of things that people in the community use,utilize,
and it would be beneficial for,it would win my support."Mr.Rodriguez replied that it was
something he had not heard about previously and that he would "take that back to the team."The
continuance was then unanimously approved.
Interview of Attorney Nick Rodriguez
Mr.Rodriguez,the developer's attorney,acknowledged in his interview that the application for
1250 West Avnenue was a contested one,with opposition from the neighboring area.He
discussed the fact that,as proposed by the developer,the development agreement would set up
a series of bonuses for the community in the way of public benefits.He said there was a non-
conforming hostel across the street from the hotel that his client had under contract to purchase.
He noted that the client developer had spoken with neighbors,City administration and elected
officials about the project.Some of the benefits were proposed by the client and some added
based on suggestions of others.
Mr.Rodriguez said he had met with Gultanoff about the project before the Planning Board
meeting,but that the comment made by Gultanoff at the meeting about a possible contribution to
"South Beach Mobility Fund"was the first time that he had heard that suggestion.He was unaware
Page 2 of 7
of any specific fund or projects to which Gultanoff was referring.He was aware that Gultanoff was
involved with an organization known as Better Streets Miami Beach,which is concerned with
traffic and mobility issues.
Interview of Nick Kallergis,Chief Deputy City Attorney
The OIG spoke with Chief Deputy City Attorney Nick Kallergis,who generally attends Planning
Board meetings and who was present at the January 7 meeting.He was familiar with the comment
made by Gultanoff regarding a possible contribution that might get his support for the project.He
said that,apart from whether the solicitation itself violated applicable ethics codes,certain
agreements made in connection with legislative changes,if not structured properly,could
implicate impermissible "contract zoning."
Mr.Kallergis said that he had also been consulted by Gultanoff about possible conflicts of interest
due to his private employment at the Miami Design Preservation League where Daniel Giraldo
was the Director.He was aware that Giraldo has made appearances before the board and
expressed opinions on pending matters while Gultanoff was a member.He did not see a conflict
of interest in violation of the City or County Ethics Codes,but felt there could be an issue under
F.S.112.313(7),Recurring Conflict of Interest,based on Giraldo's coming before the board on
multiple occasions and the fact that,as an employee of MDPL working under Giraldo's
supervision,Gultanoff could conceivably have such a conflict.He said he was seeking an opinion
from the State of Florida Commission on Ethics as to whether an actual conflict existed under
these facts.The opinion is attached to this report.
Interview of Thomas Mooney,City Planning Director
The OIG spoke with Thomas Mooney,City Planning Director,who generally attends Planning
Board meetings and was familiar with the development application.He explained that the public
benefits are part of the development agreement between the City and the developer which is
separate and apart from the zoning decision on the developer's application.He agreed to send
the OIG the draft development agreement between the City and the developer that was not yet
finalized and that would eventually have to go before the City Commission for approval.
Mr.Mooney was unaware of any fund known as the "South Beach Mobility Fund."He said that
there was a Mobility Fund controlled by the City and funded through Mobility Fee assessments
made by the City in connection with a project's impact on the surrounding area.These
assessments are established in the City Code and are the only funds deposited into the Mobility
Fee account.No contributions other than the assessments are solicited or accepted for that fund,
so any proffered contribution to that fund could not be accepted.
Interview of Michael Larkin,Attorney for 1250 West Avenue Developer
The OIG spoke with Michael Larkin,the principal attorney on behalf of the 1250 West Avenue
developer.Mr.Larkin stated that he has never had any conversations with Matthew Gultanoff
regarding possible charitable contributions in connection with the hotel's pending development
plans.He said he was aware that the City assesses a Mobility Fee in connection with concurrency
regarding a development project's impact on traffic in the area,and that the money can be used
by the City for public projects connected to the development.
Interview of Daniel Giraldo,Former Executive Director of Miami Design Preservation League
(MDPL)
The OIG interviewed Daniel Giraldo,Executive Director of the MDPL at the time of this incident
(he subsequently resigned from his position at MDPL and is currently a candidate for Miami Beach
City Commissioner).Mr.Giraldo said that he had hired Mr.Gultanoff at MDPL.He said that he
Page 3 of 7
believed that he (Ciraldo)had appeared or spoken at two or three meetings of the Miami Beach
Planning Board while Mr.Gultanoff had been a member.
Mr.Ciraldo later sent an email to the Inspector General stating that upon reviewing his personal
schedule he found that he had spoken at the 01/30/2024 Planning Board meeting on the Collins
Cove Historic Designation item;at the 10/29/2024 meeting on the Removal of Design Review
Board Requirement for homes built with understories;as well as the 1250 West Avenue project.
He stated that he spoke on these matters while Gultanoff was sitting as a member but did not
have any other conversations with Gultanoff about these issues.
Mr.Ciraldo said that he was not present at the January 7 Planning Board meeting and had not
seen the video involving the apparent solicitation of a contribution by Mr.Gultanoff.After viewing
the video,he acknowledged an appearance problem created by the solicitation,as well as the
possible appearance issue regarding his employment relationship with Gultanoff at MDPL.He
was non-committal about taking any action in connection with the possible conflict issue.
However,as the Director of MDPL at the time of his interview,he stated that he might consider
adopting a rule that would bar an employee of MDPL from serving on a City board before which
MDPL regularly appeared.
Interview of Matthew Gultanoff,Planning Board Member
Mr.Gultanoff agreed to be interviewed by the OIG on a voluntary basis to discuss the issues
raised concerning his actions and service on the City Planning Board.He came to the OIG office
for that purpose.
Mr.Gultanoff stated that his comment about a potential contribution by the 1250 West Avenue
developer was made in the context of Attorney Rodriguez's mention of public benefits to be
provided by the developer under the development agreement.He said it was intended only to
facilitate the discussion of ideas to explore in connection with the development.He said that his
organization,"Better Streets Miami Beach"was only a website and a loose confederation of
similarly-minded Miami Beach residents,rather than an actual charitable organization.This was
confirmed by the Inspector General who could not locate any such organization in State records.
Mr.Gultanoff said that he had no "mobility fund"under his control and did not intend in any way
to personally profit from any contribution in the event one was made;and that he was not aware
of the existence of a "South Beach Mobility Fund,"even though he did reference such a fund in
his comments at the meeting in connection with other possible public benefits for the City.He
denied that he intended to engage in a quid pro quo for his vote on the project.He acknowledged
that his timing and choice of words were poor and subject to misinterpretation and stated that he
would offer a clarification at the next Planning Board meeting to set the record straight.This could
not occur because by the time of the board's subsequent meeting Gultanoff's term had expired,
and the Commission had appointed another individual to the position.
Mr.Gultanoff said he was unaware that his presence on the board presented any conflict of
interest.He said that he only recalled Mr.Ciraldo's being present on one or two occasions while
he was a board member,and that he had no prior notice of Ciraldo's intent to appear on those
occasions.
As to his qualifications to sit on the board,Mr.Gultanoff stated that after a City official had
suggested that he apply for the Planning Board position,he consulted with Chief Deputy City
Attorney Nick Kallergis at the time of his application regarding whether he could be appointed to
Page 4 of 7
the "urban planning"position on the board and was advised that he could qualify based on his
resume.
Mr.Gultanoff later provided the Inspector General with an email message addressed to him from
Mr.Kallergis,dated 11/17/2023,stating as follows:"Based on your resume (particularly your work
with Better Streets),and your educational background,we have determined that you qualify to
seek appointment to the following seat on the Planning Board:'One architect registered in the
State of Florida;or a member of the faculty of a school of architecture in the state,with practical
or academic expertise in the field of design,planning,historic preservation or the history of
architecture;or a landscape architect registered in the State of Florida;or a professional practicing
in the fields of architectural or urban design,or urban planning;I am copying the City Clerk so he
is aware."[Highlighting provided in original email.]
Based on Mr.Gultanoff's work at MDPL,he was deemed to be qualified to serve on the Planning
Board.
Analysis and Conclusions
Gift Solicitation
On the issue of whether Mr.Gultanoff violated County Ethics Code provisions when he mentioned
the possibility of a contribution being provided to the City,the OIG reviewed ordinances in Section
2-11.1in the County Ethics Code and also consulted with staff at the Miami-Dade Commission
on Ethics and Public Trust.Based on this review and consultation,the OIG concluded that a
complaint for a violation of the Code's prohibition against gift solicitation would likely not be
sustained.First,the suggested donation to the "South Beach Mobility Fund"was a legal
impossibility since no such fund exists and the Mobility Fund that does exist in connection with
possible impacts on traffic in the area of a development includes only set assessments by the
City and cannot include donations in any amount.
Further,the practice of the City Commission and Administration in negotiating for "public benefits"
to be provided in project development agreements,as well as the exceptions made for such
officials under the County Ethics Code--although not technically the business of the Planning
Board--provides latitude for discussion of allowable benefits to be provided as a means of creating
favorable conditions for local government's determination of whether a development project would
serve the public interest.There is also no basis to conclude that any benefit provided by the
developer of this project in response to Mr.Gultanoff's suggestion could have inured to Gultanoff's
personal benefit or have been inconsistent with legitimate City interests.
Given the possibility that the suggested donation could be interpreted as an illegal quid pro quo
in violation of State corruption statutes and because the OIG usually consults with law
enforcement prior to reaching a conclusion on such an issue,the OIG contacted Tim
Vandergiesen,Chief of the Public Corruption Unit at the Miami-Dade County State Attorney's
Office.Following a recounting of the details of Gultanoff's actions at the January 7,2025,meeting
of the Planning Board and surrounding circumstances,the SAO declined to open a criminal
investigation of the incident.
Conflict of Interest
The possibility that a prohibited conflict of interest could be created by Mr.Gultanoff's voting on
issues before the Planning Board,which has both legislative and quasi-judicial authority and
Page 5 of 7
where his employer,MDPL,represented by his direct supervisor at that time,Daniel Giraldo,had
taken a public stand before the board,was also considered.
The applicable provision under Section 2-11.1 (v)of the Miami-Dade County Ethics Code,Voting
Conflicts:Members of Advisory and Quasi-Judicial Boards,contains a much more lenient
standard for voting conflicts than is provided for members of governing municipal bodies under
the State of Florida Code of Ethics,Chapter 112,Florida Statutes.Under the County provision a
board member would have a voting conflict only if he/she would be directly affected by an action
of the board and have one of several designated relationships with a person or entity appearing
before the board,one of which is employee/employer.While the latter condition could likely be
satisfied,the former could not in view of the absence of any benefit that would "directly"go to
Gultanoff.
Following consultation with Chief Deputy City Attorney Kallergis,as well as staff at the Miami-
Dade Commission on Ethics and Public Trust,the OIG concluded that it was unlikely that a
violation could be proven under the County Ethics Code.
The Ethics opinion solicited by Mr.Kallergis from the State of Florida Commission on Ethics
(FCOE)concerned whether a prohibited conflict of interest existed under Chapter 112,Florida
Statutes,which is applicable to all public officers and employees in the State,based on Mr.
Gultanoff's employment at MDPL during a time that his direct supervisor,Mr.Giraldo,made
appearances before the Planning Board on behalf of MDPL.The inquiry to the State did not
specifically reference Mr.Gultanoff or Mr.Giraldo but was made in the context of possible
upcoming appointments to the board.The opinion received from the FCOE was,therefore,based
on hypothetical scenarios involving possible individuals in similar situations in the future.
The attached State Ethics Commission's opinion considered three provisions of the State Ethics
Code in Chapter 112:Section 112.313(7)(a),CONFLICTING EMPLOYMENT OR
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS;Section 112.313(3),DOING BUSINESS WITH ONE'S
AGENCY;and VOTING CONFLICTS.
The State Ethics opinion did not definitively identify any violation but indicated that there were
potential future conflicts that could be created under those statutes depending on the nature of
the issues being considered,the frequency of the employer's lobbying,and other factors.The
opinion did not,however,consider the issue of an "appearance"of a conflict.
Qualifications
Based on the written opinion solicited and received by Mr.Gultanoff from the Office of the City
Attorney,his qualifications to serve on the Planning Board were established.
Recommendation
Due to the potential that future ethical conflicts of interest may be created in the event that an
employee of an organization is considered for appointment to a City board that is known to be
regularly lobbied by that employee's organization and/or supervisor,as well as the appearance
of a conflict that would almost always be present in that situation,the City should consider
adopting a policy prohibiting such appointments.If such an appointment should be voted upon in
the future,advisory opinions should be sought in advance from both the State Ethics Commission
and the Miami-Dade Commission on Ethics and Public Trust specifying the relevant facts and
surrounding circumstances of the appointment.
Page 6 of 7
Pursuant to Section 2-256 (h)of the City of Miami Beach Code of Ordinances,Matthew Gultanoff
was provided with a draft copy of this report and invited to submit a written response to it.His
response is attached.
Based on the foregoing facts and analysis,the OIG has closed this inquiry.
cc:Ricardo Dopico,City Attorney
Nick Kallergis,Chief Deputy City Attorney
Thomas Mooney,Planning Director
George T.Neary,Interim Executive Director,MDPL
Attorney Thomas Robertson (for Nick Rodriguez and Michael Larkin)
Daniel Ciraldo
Matthew Gultanoff
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL.City of Miami Beach
1130 Washington Avenue,6Floor,Miami Beach,FL 33139
Tel:305.673.7020 •Hotline:786.897.1111
Email:CityofMiamieachQIG@miamibeachfl.gov
Website:www.mbinspectorgeneral.com
Page 7 of 7
Luis M.Fuste
Chair
Tina Descovich
Vice Chair
Paul D.Bain
Dr.James Bush,Ill
Freddie Figgers
Laird A.Lile
Ashley Lukis
Linda Stewart
March 27,2025
State of Florida
COMMISSION ON ETHICS
P.O.Drawer 15709
Tallahassee,Florida 32317-5709
325 John Knox Road
Building E,Suite 200
Tallahassee,Florida 32303
"A Public Office is a Public Trust"
Kerrie J.Stillman
Executive Director
Steven J.Zuilkowski
Deputy Executive Director/
General Counsel
(850)488-7864 Phone
(850)488-3077 (FAX)
www.ethics.state.fl.us
Mr.Nick Kallergis
Transmitted by email to:nickkallergis@miamibeachfl.gov
Re:Your Ethics Inquiry
Dear Mr.Kallergis:
This is in response to your ethics inquiry.You note that you are a City Attorney for the City of
Miami Beach,Florida.In your inquiry,you state that you are considering candidates for
appointment to the City of Miami Beach Planning Board.You indicate some of these candidates
are employed by a non-profit organization which currently has a Management Agreement with the
City,wherein it manages and operates the City-owned 10""Street Auditorium as the Art Deco
Museum &Welcome Center.Specifically,you explain that the Management Agreement requires
the organization to operate the Art Deco Visitor's Center,Museum,Lecture and Film Hall,Art
Deco Academy I Tour School,and Gift Shop,and to conduct preservation education.
You also state that the Executive Director of this organization lobbies before the Planning Board
(as well as other City Boards)on legislative matters.Specifically,you note that in 2024,the
organization lobbied the Planning Board on the following matters:
•Ordinance designating the Collins Canal as an individual historic site (I /30/2024)
•Ordinance amending the Land Development Regulations to remove the requirement
that the Design Review Board review homes built with understories (I 0/29/2024)
Nick Kallergis
March 27,2025
Page 2
•Ordinances amending the Land Development Regulations and Comprehensive Plan to
create the Alton Beach Bayfront Overlay (I 0/29/2024)
•Ordinance amending the Land Development Regulations and Comprehensive Plan to
create the North Beach Oceanfront Overlay (11/16/2024)
Against this factual backdrop,you ask whether appointing one ofthese candidates to the Planning
Board would present any ethical concerns.
The first provision relevant to your inquiry is Section 112.313(7)(a),Florida Statutes,1 which
states:
CONFLICTING EMPLOYMENT OR CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONSHIPS.--No public officer or employee of an agency
shall have or hold any employment or contractual relationship with
any business entity or any agency which is subject to the regulation
of,or is doing business with,an agency of which he or she is an
officer or employee ...;nor shall an officer or employee of an
agency have or hold any employment or contractual relationship that
will create a continuing or frequently recurring conflict between his
or her private interests and the performance of his or her public
duties or that would impede the full and faithful discharge of his or
her public duties.
Section 112.313(7)(a)has two parts,with the first clause prohibiting a public officer or employee
from having employment or a contractual relationship with any business entity or agency that is
subject to the regulation of,or is doing business with his agency.Section 112.312(2),Florida
Statutes defines "agency"as any state,regional,county,local,or municipal entity of the state,
whether executive,judicial,or legislative;any department,division,bureau,commission,
authority,or political subdivision ofthis state therein;or any public school,community college,or
state university.Relevant to your inquiry,in the past,the Commission on Ethics has opined that a
city planning board is a separate agency from the city commission (CEO O 1-16;CEO 11-6).Thus,
were either of these two candidates appointed to the Planning Board,their "agency"for purposes
of this analysis would just be the Planning Board,and not the City as a whole.
In subsequent communications with Commission staff,you have indicated the Planning Board
itself is not a party to the Management Agreement;the contract is between the City and the
nonprofit organization.Thus,it appears that were either of these candidates appointed to the
Planning Board,they would not run afoul of the first part of Section 112.313(7)(a),Florida
1 The Commission opinion and statutes cited herein are viewable at www.ethics.state.fl.us.
Nick Kallergis
March 27,2025
Page 3
Statutes,as they would not have an employment relationship with a business entity (the nonprofit)
that is doing business with their agency (the Planning Board).
The second clause of Section 112.313(7)(a)prohibits a public officer from having an employment
or contractual relationship that would create a continuing or frequently recurring conflict of interest
or would create an impediment to the full and faithful discharge of his or her public duties.
Here,there is concern that the candidates may have a conflict under the second clause ofthe statute
due to the lobbying efforts of the Executive Director of their organization.There is a distinction
recognized when the public officer or employee is employed by or has a contractual relationship
with an entity engaged in lobbying his or her board on issues of general policy.An officer or
employee will not be in violation of the second part of Section 1 I 2.313(7)(a)so long as the
lobbying concerns issues of general interest to the community-as opposed to an insular matters
affecting only an employer or client-and the officer or employee does not assist in the lobbying
efforts.See CEO 89-29 (finding a city commissioner could serve as executive director of a
chamber of commerce that lobbied the city on topics that concerned the city as a whole,provided
the commissioner did not aid in the lobbing;examples of such general lobbying issues are provided
therein);CEO 15-1,Question I (finding city councilmember can be employed by chamber of
commerce lobbying the city on "issues of general interest in the community"if his role for the
chamber is "divorced"from lobbing activities).Opinions also have found no conflict under the
second part of Section 112.3 I 3(7)(a)when the lobbying is infrequent and the public officer or
employee plays no role in it.See CEO 04-6,CEO 12-21,and CEO 23-6.
Applying the logic ofthese opinions to the facts you present,it appears that,in the past,the matters
on which the organization employing the candidates has engaged in lobbying before the Planning
Board concern broad issues of general policy that affect the community at large.However,if a
scenario arises where the organization engages in lobbying on matters only affecting the
organization or a client ofthe organization,it is possible the candidates may run afoul ofthe second
part of Section I I 2.313(7)(a).As such,if a matter of concern comes up in the future,or if the
lobbying becomes more frequent,you or the candidates should contact the Commission for
specific guidance on the issue.
Additionally,regarding the second part of Section I 12.313(7)(a),you have indicated in subsequent
communications with Commission staff that,although the Planning Board is not a party to the
Management Agreement between the nonprofit organization and the City,the Planning Board is
required by the City Charter to review and make recommendations on any management agreement
for any City property with a term of ten years or longer.Because of this,it appears that the
candidates for appointment to the Planning Board may at some point be placed in a situation where
they are reviewing the work that is done by the nonprofit organization that employs them pursuant
to the Management Agreement between the nonprofit and the City.This would likely violate the
second part of Section 112.313(7)(a)as it would create a conflict between their public duties on
Nick Kallergis
March 27,2025
Page 4
the Planning Board and their private interests as it pertains to their employer.For instance,the
candidates may be tempted to give a favorable review of the nonprofit's work pertaining to the
Management Agreement because the nonprofit is their employer.It is important to note that even
if the two candidates abstain from voting on matters concerning the Management Agreement,this
will not cure a conflict under Section l l 2.3 l 3(7)(a),as this statute operates separate and apart from
the voting conflict law (which is discussed below).
A second provision relevant to your inquiry is Section 112.313(3),Florida Statutes,which states:
DOING BUSINESS WITH ONE'S AGENCY.-No
employee of an agency acting in his or her official capacity as a
purchasing agent,or public officer acting in his or her official
capacity,shall either directly or indirectly purchase,rent,or lease
any realty,goods,or services for his or her own agency from any
business entity of which the officer or employee or the officer's or
employee's spouse or child is an officer,partner,director,or
proprietor or in which such officer or employee or the officer's or
employee's spouse or child,or any combination of them,has a
material interest.Nor shall a public officer or employee,acting in a
private capacity,rent,lease,or sell any realty,goods,or services to
the officer's or employee's own agency,ifhe or she is a state officer
or employee,or to any political subdivision or any agency thereof,
if he or she is serving as an officer or employee of that political
subdivision.
Section 112.313(3)prohibits the candidates from selling any goods or services in their private
capacities to their own public agency,which,as outlined above,would be the Planning Board.
Section 112.313(3)also prohibits the candidates from selling any goods or services in their private
capacities to any political subdivision or any agency thereof,if they are serving as an officer or
employee of that political subdivision.Thus,unlike in the analysis under Section 112.313(7)(a),
which just focuses on the specific agency of the public officer or employee,Section 112.313(3)
implicates the public officer or employee's entire political subdivision.Here,the City as a whole
will be the candidates'political subdivision if they are appointed to the Planning Board.
The Commission has applied Section 112.316,Florida Statutes,to "grandfather"in employment
or contractual relationships with business entities selling services to the officer's agency when both
the employment or contractual relationship and the business relationship with the agency predate
the officer's holding office.See CEO 82-10,CEO 96-31,CEO 02-14,CEO 08-4 (note 6),and CEO
09-1.But renewals/extensions/amendments of grandfathered contracts after one takes office can
violate the statute unless the terms of a contract remain exactly the same.See CEO 02-14,CEO
03-17,CEO 08-8,CEO 09-1,and CEO 22-5.Moreover,entry into new contracts after one takes
office can also trigger a violation.See CEO 09-20 and CEO 10-16.Here,since you have indicated
that both the candidates'employment with the nonprofit organization,as well as the Management
Agreement currently in place between the organization and the City,predate the candidates'future
Nick Kallergis
March 27,2025
Page 5
appointment to the Planning Board,it appears the current sale ofservices by the candidates'private
employer to their potential future public agency will be "grandfathered"in.However,if the
contract's term expires and a new Management Agreement is formed,grandfathering will be lost
and a violation could be found.
In subsequent communications with Commission staff,you indicated that one of the candidates
may be in a more managerial role within the nonprofit.Regardless of the candidates'specific job
titles,if either one of them is appointed to the Planning Board and then acts,either directly or
indirectly in his private capacity at the nonprofit organization,to sell services to the City (via a
renewal to the Management Agreement,adding new terms to the Agreement,or entering into a
new and separate Management Agreement with the City,for example),this would trigger a
violation of Section 112.313(3)and they would lose the "grandfathering"exemption previously
discussed.It is also important to note that if either of the candidates are specifically designated as
officers or owners of the nonprofit organization,regardless of their personal participation in the
matter,they would de-facto be in violation of this statute were the organization to enter into a new
agreement to sell services to the City or modify the terms of the existing agreement.And if these
candidates are faced with a vote on the matter,compliance with the voting conflict statute
(discussed below)will not cure a violation of this Section 112.313(3).
Another statute that is relevant to your inquiry is the voting conflict statute found in Section
112.3143,Florida Statutes.This statute states:
No county,municipal,or other local public officer shall vote
in an official capacity upon any measure which would inure to his
or her special private gain or loss;which he or she knows would
inure to the special private gain or loss of any principal by whom he
or she is retained or to the parent organization or subsidiary of a
corporate principal by which he or she is retained,other than an
agency as defined in s.112.312(2);or which he or she knows would
inure to the special private gain or loss of a relative or business
associate of the public officer.Such public officer shall,prior to the
vote being taken,publicly state to the assembly the nature of the
officer's interest in the matter from which he or she is abstaining
from voting and,within 15 days after the vote occurs,disclose the
nature of his or her interest as a public record in a memorandum
filed with the person responsible for recording the minutes of the
meeting,who shall incorporate the memorandum in the minutes.
k k k
(4)No appointed public officer shall participate in any matter
which would inure to the officer's special private gain or loss;which
Nick Kallergis
March 27,2025
Page 6
the officer knows would inure to the special private gain or loss of
any principal by whom he or she is retained or to the parent
organization or subsidiary of a corporate principal by which he or
she is retained;or which he or she knows would inure to the special
private gain or loss of a relative or business associate of the public
officer,without first disclosing the nature of his or her interest in the
matter.
The term "special private gain or loss"as it applies to voting conflicts is defined as an economic
benefit or harm.See Section l 12.3143(l)(d),Florida Statutes.In the past,the Commission has
found that the threshold for a "special gain"occurs when the official or his or her employer
constitutes around 1-2%of the size ofthe class of persons affected by a particular vote.See CEO
13-20.
The nonprofit organization which employs the candidates is considered "a principal by whom [they
are]retained"by virtue of being their employer.See Section l 12.3143(l)(a),Florida Statutes.
Thus,ifthe candidates are appointed to the Planning Board and are put a position where they will
be asked to vote on a matter in their official capacities that could inure to the special private gain
or loss of the organization,they must abstain from voting on the matter.Additionally,prior to the
vote being taken,they shall publicly state the nature of their interest in the matter,and,within 15
days after the vote occurs,disclose the nature of their interest as a public record by filing a Form
8B with the person responsible for recording the minutes of the meeting.The Form 8B is available
on the Commission's website.
Additionally,because you indicate positions on the Planning Board are appointed,pursuant to
Section I 12.3143(4)(a),the candidates will also be prohibited from even participating in any
discussions on the matter,unless,prior to the meeting where the discussion will take place,they
first disclose the nature of their interest as a public record,either orally or by filing a Form 8B with
the person responsible for recording the minutes of the meeting.See Section 112.3143(4)(b),
Florida Statutes.
In conclusion,there are multiple statutes implicated by this scenario:
•Regarding the first part of Section l l 2.313(7)(a),it appears that the appointment of
these candidates to the Planning Board will not automatically trigger a violation,as
their agency (the Planning Board)is not a party to the current Management Agreement
between their employer and the City.
•Regarding the second part of Section l I 2.313(7)(a),it appears that past lobbying efforts
their employer has engaged in before the Planning Board concern matters of general
applicability.Thus,it appears this type of lobbying is not the type that would
necessarily trigger a violation under the second part of the statute.However,if the
Nick Kallergis
March 27,2025
Page 7
nature or frequency of the lobbying changes,this could present a problem under the
statute.
•Additionally,you note that the Planning Board is required by the City Charter to review
the Management Agreement because it is a contract that exceeds ten years.Because of
this,it appears the candidates,if appointed to the Planning Board,may be placed in a
situation where they are,in their public capacity,reviewing work conducted by their
private employer.This would trigger a violation of the second part of Section
I I 2.3 l 3(7)(a),as it would create a conflict between their public duties and their private
interests as employees ofthe nonprofit organization that is a party to the Management
Agreement.
•Regarding Section 112.313(3),it appears that the current Management Agreement will
not trigger a violation of the statute due to the "grandfathering"exemption that would
apply to the two candidates pursuant to Section 112.316.However,ifa new agreement
is formed,or the terms ofthe current agreement change,"grandfathering"would be lost
and the two candidates would be in violation of Section 112.313(3)if they are an officer
or owner ofthe nonprofit or have private responsibilities concerning the agreement.
•Regarding the voting conflicts statute found in Section 112.3143,abstaining from
voting on matters pertaining to their private employer will not cure any conflicts the
candidates may have under Sections 112.313(3)and I l 2.3 l 3(7)(a).However,if the
candidates are faced with votes pertaining to the nonprofit organization that do not
necessarily concern the Management Agreement at issue,they should still comply with
the requirements of the voting conflict statute.
The guidance provided in this letter is limited to the facts that have been provided.If there are
additional material facts,or if I have misstated them in this letter,please contact me again.If you
have any other questions about the guidance contained in this letter,please send me an email at
naomi.amelia@leg.state.fl.us.
Sincerely,
Amelia Naomi
Attorney,Florida Commission on Ethics
TO:Joseph M.Centorino,Inspector General
FROM:Matthew Gultanoff,Former Planning Board Member
DATE:July 22,2025
RE:Response to OIG Report -Planning Board Member Inquiry
I appreciate the Inspector General's investigation,which found no violations in my conduct and cleared
my name of the anonymous complaints that prompted this inquiry.The investigation's conclusions
validate my commitment to ethical public service and demonstrate that these allegations appear to be
attempts to undermine my advocacy for progressive transportation policy,pro-housing initiatives,and
decisions that prioritize community needs over special interests.
My January 7th comments must be understood in proper context.I had raised serious concerns about
the proposed project at 1250 West Ave:its excessive height and scale,and its focus on ultra-luxury units
that would provide fewer housing units than the existing building proposed for demolition.The existing
building provides over 200 housing units that serve Miami Beach's working class,young professionals,
and retirees on fixed incomes,units that would be replaced by fewer ultra-luxury accommodations for
part-time residents.
This project reflects broader development trends that have been encouraged through policy decisions.
The City has approved and/or negotiated development agreements with zoning changes for numerous
luxury high-rise towers while publicly praising "density reductions."It's no surprise that Miami Beach's
population has declined significantly (by approximately 10,000 according to recent estimates)while
Florida has boomed,growing by over 8%from 2020 to 2025.Meanwhile,according to US Census Bureau
data,more than 60%of South Beach and North Beach households are renter-occupied,yet the city's
policies favor luxury part-time units over full-time housing serving existing residents.
When the developer's representative stated they would rework their public benefits package due to
community feedback,I offered constructive suggestions.The "mobility fund"contribution would be
made to the City to implement the long-stalled adopted bicycle-pedestrian master plan.Based on my
review of completed projects,the City has made abysmal progress,adding fewer than four net new
miles of bicycle lanes in the past five years.This addresses a critical need:according to the 2024 Miami
Beach Resident Survey,over half of households include someone who regularly bikes for transportation,
while the City's draft budget allocates only $300,000 for bicycle projects next year.Miami Beach's
recently adopted Vision Zero Action Plan shows the consequences:over the past six years,there have
been 682 reported crashes involving bicyclists,resulting in 44 serious reported injuries and 2 deaths,
both residents of the city.
The investigation confirms my qualifications.Before applying,I sought written confirmation from Chief
Deputy City Attorney Nick Kallergis,who confirmed in a November 17,2023 email that my education
and professional experience qualified me for the "urban planning"seat.The anonymous complaints
about my urban planning qualifications are interesting,given my successor's supposed qualifications as a
real estate sales agent and luxury condo board president.Also,recently released campaign finance
documents show he made two maximum contributions to commissioners who voted for his
appointment.
It's worth noting that the idea of my serving originated with sitting Commissioners who encouraged me
to apply.One approached me during the summer of 2023 (though I initially declined),and another urged
me to seek appointment the morning after the election.During that same 2023 election campaign,
candidates could sit on this board while affiliated committees accepted contributions from parties with
business before the City,making attacks on my ethics particularly ironic.My expertise in urban
transportation and mobility is well-documented and publicly recognized through numerous media
appearances,publications,and professional conferences.My record speaks for itself.
I am proud of my service on the Planning Board.It was an honor,and it is the community who lost a
voice for transparency,community engagement,and evidence-based decision making.I remain
committed to advocating for policies that make Miami Beach more affordable,sustainable,and
accessible,prioritizing residents who are the backbone of our city.The investigation found no violations,
I was qualified for the position,and I served the public interest.I thank the Inspector General for
clearing my name of these allegations.
Respectfully submitted,
Matthew Gultanoff