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HomeMy WebLinkAboutLTC 151-2026 Court Victory in Adam Bidas v. City of Miami Beach and Tremont Towing, Summary Judgment on Towing Rate ChallengeMIAMI BEACH OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY LTC #151-2026 LETTER TO COMMISSION TO: Mayor Steven Meiner and Members of the City Commission FROM: Ricardo J. Dopico, City Attorney DATE: April 16, 2026© SUBJECT: Court Victory in Adam Bidas v. City of Miami Beach and Tremont Towing, Summary Judgment on Towing Rate Challenge The purpose of this L TC is to advise the Mayor and City Commission of a significant court victory in litigation challenging the City's towing practices and rates. On March 27, 2026, the County Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit entered a Final Summary Judgment in favor of the City of Miami Beach and its co-defendant towing contractor, Tremont Towing, disposing of all claims asserted by the plaintiff. This case involved both state law and federal constitutional claims arising from a single vehicle tow within the City. The plaintiff alleged, among other things, negligent misrepresentation, negligent omission, violations of equal protection, and violations of due process, all premised on an alleged challenge to the City's towing rates and related policies. The plaintiff also asserted an unjust enrichment claim against the City's authorized towing contractor. The parties engaged in substantial written discovery, depositions, motion practice, and briefing, including competing motions for summary judgment. The Court considered a fully developed record and conducted a detailed legal analysis of each claim prior to ruling. In a comprehensive eight-page order, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on all counts and denied the plaintiff's motion in its entirety. The Court found, among other things: •The plaintiff could not establish reliance or causation to support a negligent misrepresentation claim;•The City's decisions regarding signage and dissemination of towing informationconstitute discretionary, planning-level governmental functions protected by sovereign immunity; •The City's towing rate structure and payment policies satisfy rational basis review and do not violate equal protection; •The City afforded adequate procedural safeguards,including notice and an available administrative hearing process,defeating any due process claim;and •The towing contractor acted within lawful authority,precluding any unjust enrichment claim. The Court further entered final judgment in favor of the City and dismissed the case in its entirety,concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the City was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all claims. This decision is significant in that it rejects a multi-faceted legal challenge to the City's towing rate structure and related operational policies,including constitutional claims that could have had broader implications if successful. The case was handled entirely in-house by the City Attorney's Office.The litigation team included Deputy City Attorney Henry J.Hunnefeld,First Assistant City Attorney Freddi Mack,Assistant City Attorney II Benjamin Braun,and Litigation Fellow Carla Pompa. A copy of the Court's Final Summary Judgment Order is attached for your review.While the Order is final at the trial court level,the plaintiff retains the right to appeal. As always,please feel free to contact me or the City Attorney's Office should you have any questions regarding this matter. RJD/hjh/mm 2 Filing#244811219 E-Filed 03/27/2026 10:45:36 PM IN THE COUNTY COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR MIAMI-DADE COUNTY,FLORIDA CASE NO:2025-047140-SP-24 SECTION:ND05 JUDGE:Chiaka Ihekwaba Adam Bidas Plaintiff(s)/Petitioner(s) vs. City of Miami Beach et al Defendant(s)/Respondent(s) ____________/ FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Docket Index Number:119 THIS CAUSE came before the Court on the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants'Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment.The Court,having reviewed the motions, responses,the record,having heard argument ofcounsel,and the Plaintiff pro-se and being otherwise fully advised in the premises,hereby finds and orders as follows: I.STANDARD OF REVIEW Effective May 1,2021,the Florida Supreme Court amended Florida Rule ofCivil Procedure 1.51 0(c)to adopt the Federal summary judgment standard of Celotex Corp.v.Catrett,477 U.S.317 (1986);Anderson v.Liberty Lobby,Inc.,477 U.S.242 (1986);and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.v.Zenith Radio Corp.,475 U.S.574 (1986).See In re:Amendments to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510,309 So.3d 192 (Fla.2020). "[T]he federal summary judgment standard 'mirrors'the standard for a directed verdict."Id.(citing Anderson,477 U.S.at 250).Summary judgment is appropriate ifthe movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fla.R.Civ.P.1.51 0(c).The movant may meet its burden by demonstrating that there is a lack of evidence to support the essential elements that the nonmovant must prove at trial.Celotex,477 U.S. at 322-23.If the movant satisfies that standard,the burden shifts to the nonmovant to "come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."Matsushita,475 U.S.at 587 (quotation marks and citation omitted). For a non-movant to avoid summary judgment,a factual dispute must be both material and Case No:2025-047140-SP-24 Page I of8 genuine.Anderson,477 U.S.at 247-48.A fact is "material"if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law."Id.at 248.To raise a "genuine"dispute,the nonmovant must point to enough evidence that "a reasonable jury could return a verdict"for it.Id.;see also In Re: Amendments to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510,317 So.3d 72 (Mem.)(Fla.2021 ). II.UNDISPUTED FACTUAL BACKGROUND Adam Bidas (Plaintiff)parked his vehicle in a restricted tow away residential zone within the City of Miami Beach (Defendant).Plaintiff was subsequently issued a parking citation and the vehicle was later towed by Tremont Towing,Inc.(Co-Defendant).Co-Defendant is a duly authorized towing operator permitted to provide such services within the City of Miami Beach.Plaintiffwas required to pay a total of $458.01 to retrieve his vehicle.Thereafter,Plaintiff filed suit asserting multiple claims against Defendant,City of Miami Beach and a claim for unjust enrichment against co-Defendant Tremont Towing Inc. The Court addresses each of Plaintiffs claims in turn. III.CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT -CITY OF MIAMI BEACH A.Negligent Misrepresentation Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant negligently misrepresented towing rates by publishing incorrect information on its official website. To bring a successful claim based on negligent misrepresentation,a plaintiff needs to prove that: "(1)a misrepresentation of material fact that was believed to be true but which was in fact false;(2) defendant was negligent in making the statement because he should have known the representation was false;(3)defendant intended to induce the plaintiff to rely ...on the misrepresentation;and (4) injury resulted to the plaintiff acting in justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation."Specialty Marine &Indus.Supplies,Inc.v.Venus,66 So.3d 306,310 (Fla.1st DCA 2011). Even assuming,arguendo,that incorrect information was published on the official website, (Defendant disputes this allegation)Plaintiffs claim still fails as a matter of law.The undisputed evidence establishes that Plaintiff did not review the City's website until after his vehicle had already been towed and while he was en route to retrieve the vehicle and furthennore he did not pursue available administrative remedies to contest the citation or fees.As such,Plaintiff could not have relied on any alleged misrepresentation in making decisions prior to the tow.Because there was no reliance (let alone detrimental reliance)the essential element of causation is absent. Case No:2025-047140-SP-24 Page 2 of8 Additionally,the Court makes no reference to Plaintiff's claim regarding towing rates found through a Google search.The Defendant cannot be held liable for information displayed in external search engine results,as such content is outside the control ofthe Defendant.Liability for misrepresentation is limited to information published or endorsed by the Defendant itself,not third- party sources or platforms beyond its authority. Furthermore,It is important to note that the present action is an individual lawsuit brought solely by Plaintiff and does not constitute a class action.Plaintiff is not authorized to assert claims on behalf ofother individuals or the general public.Accordingly,any assertions that the City has fostered "an environment of general misinformation,where the public does not know what the right tow rates actually are,"exceed the scope of Plaintiff's standing in this matter.The Court's review is limited to the specific facts and circumstances relevant to Plaintiff's own experience and claims, rather than any alleged impact on the broader public. Accordingly,there is no genuine issue of material fact as to negligent misrepresentation and the Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim. B.Negligent Omission Plaintiff next contends that the Defendant had a duty to prominently display towing rates throughout the city especially on signs or bridges,and that its failure to do so constitutes negligent omission. This claim is barred by sovereign immunity.The Defendant's decisions regarding the posting and placement of signage are planning-level discretionary functions for which the Defendant retains sovereign immunity.Sovereign immunity derives exclusively from the separation of powers provision found in Article II,section 3 ofthe Florida Constitution.Wallace v.Dean,3 So.3d 1035, 1045 (Fla.2009).Sovereign immunity prohibits the judiciary from "second guess[ing]the political and police power"decisions of coordinate branches ofgovernment "absent a violation of constitutional or statutory rights."Trianon Park Condo.Ass'n v City of Hialeah,468 So.2d 912 at 918,see also Storm v Town of Ponce Inlet,866 So.2d at 715 (holding that the government has no general duty to individual members of society to give accurate information).While the Florida Legislature has codified the limited waiver of sovereign tort immunity in section 768.28,Fla.Stat., the doctrine of separation ofpowers mandates that "certain [quasi-legislative]policymaking, planning or judgmental governmental functions cannot be the subject oftraditional tort liability." Wallace,3 So.3d at 1053 (citing Commercial Carrier Corp.v.Indian River Cnty.,3 71 So.2d 1010, 1020 (Fla.1979)).Accordingly,where governmental actions are deemed discretionary,as opposed to operational,the government has absolute immunity from suit.See Commercial Carrier Corp.. 371 So.2d at 1020-22.Decisions regarding whether,where,and how to place signage,including signage related to towing rates,are discretionary,planning-level governmental functions.Such decisions involve policy considerations and allocation of municipal resources and are therefore immune from suit. A "discretionary"planning-level function involves "an exercise of executive or legislative power Case No:2025-047140-SP-24 Page 3 of8 such that a court's intervention by way oftort law would inappropriately entangle the court in fundamental questions of policy and planning."Mosby v.Harrell,909 So.2d 323,328 (Fla.1st DCA 2005). Because the alleged duty arises from a planning-level function,the Defendant cannot be held liable as a matter of law.Summary judgment is therefore appropriate in favor ofthe Defendant on this claim of negligent omission. C.Equal Protection Claims I-Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant violated the Equal Protection Clause by charging non- residents higher towing rates than residents. Equal protection is not violated merely because some persons are treated differently than other persons.City of Miami y.Haigley,143 So.3d 1025,1034 (Fla.3d DCA 2014).Both the United States Supreme Court and Florida courts have consistently held that the Equal Protection Clause requires only similar treatment of similarly situated individuals and that there must be a rational basis for the difference in treatment.Plyler v.Doe,457 U.S.202,216 (1982)("The Equal Protection Clause directs that 'all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."');see also Jackson v.State,137 So.3d 470,474 (Fla.4th DCA 2014)("Equal protection does not require identity oftreatment.It only requires that the distinction have some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made,and that the different treatments be not so disparate as to be wholly arbitrary."). "[B]ecause the judiciary defers to the legislature to determine which groups and conduct to regulate,[the Court]uphold[s]legislation that has 'some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose,'unless the legislation's classification is based on a suspect classification or a fundamental right."Haigley,143 So.3d at 1034 (Fla.3d DCA 2014)(citing Estate of McCall v.United States, 134 So.3d 894,901 (Fla.2014).It is well established precedent that when applying the rational basis test,courts "undertake only a limited review that is highly deferential to the legislature's choice of ends and means."Progressive Am.Ins.Co v.Eduardo J.Garrido DC.P.A 211 So.3d 1086,1091 (Fla.3d DCA 2017)(quoting Silvio Membreno &Fla.Ass'n of Vendors Inc.v.City of Hialeah,188 So.3d 13,22 Fla.3d DCA 2016)).The challenger who in this case is the Plaintiff, has the burden of proving "that there is no conceivable factual predicate which would rationally support the law."Id.(emphasis in original). Indeed,a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.See F.C.C.v.Beach Communications,Inc., 508 U.S.307 (1993)."Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle ofjudicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function."Id.(quoting Lehnhausen v.Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.,410 U.S.356,365 (1973)). Where a classification does not implicate a fundamental right or a suspect class,it needs only bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.The Defendant has articulated a rational basis for the differential treatment,namely,that residents contribute to municipal services through Case No:2025-047140-SP-24 Page 4 of8 the payment of ad valorem taxes,whereas non-residents do not. This distinction is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective and is neither arbitrary nor irrational.Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate otherwise.Therefore,it follows that the charging of residents a lower tow rate than non-residents is not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. II -Plaintiff also challenges the different payment methods allowed for residents versus non- residents.He asserts that "residents may pay by credit card,while everyone else must go to an ATM and incur additional fees.This amounts to illegal discrimination as there is no rational basis for this." Plaintiffs assertion is incorrect.The Defendant's policy of allowing residents to pay by credit card but requiring out-of-County visitors to pay by cash (or similar payment)also finds a conceivable rational basis:credit card transactions take time to process and may not ultimately go through.If a credit card transaction is declined,the City can more easily pursue collections from a local resident. But collection efforts are much more difficult (ifnot infeasible)from out ofcounty visitors not to mention someone like Plaintiff,who is from out ofthe country and lives in Canada.Thus,the Defendant rationally requires non-residents to pay in cash,money order,or a similar tender that requires zero processing to be valid tender.This also has a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest and is therefore not a violation ofthe Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly,the Equal Protection claims fail as a matter of law and Summary Judgment is appropriate in favor of the Defendant on this claim(s). D.Due Process Claim Plaintiff further alleges that the towing fees imposed constitute a deprivation of significant property interest without due process of law. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish the existence ofa constitutionally protected property interest sufficient to invoke substantive due process protections.The fees at issue are authorized by law and arise from the enforcement of municipal regulations governing parking and towing.Plaintiff has not demonstrated that such fees implicate a fundamental right or a protected liberty or property interest of constitutional dimension. Moreover,Plaintiff has not established that the Defendant's actions were arbitrary or capricious so as to implicate substantive due process concerns. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant,pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment,is constitutionally required to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard before depriving an individual of property through the imposition of towing fees.Contrary to Plaintiffs claims,the City has established an administrative remedy process that allows individuals to contest or challenge citations and associated fees. Case No:2025-047140-SP-24 Page 5 of 8 Prior to the commencement ofthis lawsuit,there was correspondence between Assistant Parking Director Alberto Ventura and Plaintiffvia email.In this exchange,Mr.Ventura informed Plaintiff that the towing of his vehicle was the result of a parking violation.Mr.Ventura further advised Plaintiffof his right to request a hearing regarding the citation and fees imposed.Critically,Mr. Ventura explained that if the hearing officer ruled in Plaintiffs favor,the towing fee would be reimbursed. Despite being provided with clear notice and the opportunity to contest the charges,Plaintiff chose not to pursue any challenge or hearing.Accordingly,Plaintiff's assertion that he was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard is inaccurate.The City explicitly explained the available administrative remedies and assured Plaintiffthat a refund would be issued if he prevailed in the hearing process. As such,the Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this Due Process claim. IV.CLAIM AGAINST TREMONT TOWING COMPANY -UNJUST ENRICHMENT Plaintiff asserts a claim for unjust enrichment against the co-Defendant-Tremont Towing Inc., alleging that it improperly retained the towing fees. To prevail on a claim for unjust enrichment,the Plaintiff must establish,that a benefit was provided to the co-Defendant,the co-Defendant had knowledge ofthe benefit and either accepted or retained it;the co-Defendant accepted or retained the benefit under circumstances that make it unjust (inequitable)for them to keep it without paying for it. Here,the undisputed evidence demonstrates that the fees charged by the co-Defendant were authorized by applicable law and did not exceed the maximum allowable rates.Co-Defendant acted within the scope of lawful municipal authority and charged only amounts permitted by applicable ordinances and statutes.Plaintiff paid the required amount to retrieve his vehicle,and there is no evidence that the charges were unlawful,excessive,or improperly imposed and neither did they exceed established maximum allowable rates. Because the Towing Company acted within the bounds of the law,Plaintiff cannot establish that retention of the payment was inequitable. Accordingly,the unjust enrichment claim fails as a matter of law and the Co-Defendant is entitled to Summary Judgment in its favor on this claim of unjust enrichment. V.PROCEDURAL BAR TO UNPLED CLAIMS This Court will not consider any claims that were not originally pied,unless the proper procedures to add,amend,or include such claims have been followed.It is well-established under Florida law that a party cannot obtain summary judgment on a cause of action that was never pied.As stated in Case No:2025-047140-SP-24 Page 6 of8 Fla.Ins.Guar.Ass'n v.Feijoo,388 So.3d 1059,1060 (Fla.3D DCA 2024)(citing Fernandez v. Fla.Nat'l Coll..Inc.,925 So.2d I 096,110 I (Fla.3d DCA 2006)),"issues that are not pied in a complaint cannot be considered by the trial court at a summary judgment hearing." Plaintiff did not plead an Eighth Amendment excessive fines claim in either the Original Statement of Claim or the Amended Statement of Claim,as ordered by this Court.Instead,for the first time on October 25,2025,Plaintiff filed a document titled "Memorandum of Law"that purported to raise the excessive fines claim.This filing occurred after Defendant had already submitted its Motion for Summary Judgment addressing the claims that were actually pied,and after Plaintiff had filed both his Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting memorandum.Because this issue was not raised in the pleadings and has never been consented to,it is procedurally barred at this stage. VI.CONCLUSION There being no genuine issues of material fact and Defendants being entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all claims,it is hereby: ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 1.Defendant,City of Miami Beach's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 2.Co-Defendant,Tremont Towing Inc's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED 3.Plaintiff Adam Bidas's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. 4.Final judgment is entered in favor of Defendants,City of Miami Beach and Tremont Towing Inc.,and against Plaintiff,Adam Bidas,on all claims. 5.The lawsuit filed by Plaintiff against both Defendants is DISMISSED 6.Plaintiff shall take nothing by this action and Defendant and co-Defendant shall go hence without day. DONE and ORDERED in Chambers at Miami-Dade County,Florida on this 27"day of March, 2026. 2025-047140-SP-24 03-27-2026 I 0:37 PM Hon.Chiaka lhekwaba COUNTY COURT JUDGE Electronically Signed Case No:2025-047140-SP-24 Page 7 of8 Final Order as to All Parties SRS #:12 (Other) THE COURT DISMISSES THIS CASE AGAINST ANY PARTY NOT LISTED IN THIS FINAL ORDER OR PREVIOUS ORDER(S).THIS CASE IS CLOSED AS TO ALL PARTIES. Electronically Served: •City of Miami Beach:RicardoDopico@miamibeachtl.gov •Adam Bidas:AdamBidas@Live.ca •Adam Bidas:AdamBidas@Live.ca •Adam Bidas:AdamBidas@Live.ca •Alexander Stephen Orlofsky:alex@orlofskylawfirm.com •Alexander Stephen Orlofsky:meghan@orlofskylawfirm.com •Carla Pompa:carlapompa@miamibeachtl.gov •Carla Pompa:merarimotola@miamibeachtl.gov •Carla Pompa:freddimack@miamibeachfl.gov •Freddi Rebecca Mack:freddimack@miamibeachfl.gov •Freddi Rebecca Mack:merarimotola@miamibeachfl.gov •Freddi Rebecca Mack:carlapompa@miamibeachtl.gov •Henry J Hunnefeld:henryhunnefeld@miamibeachfl.gov •Henry J Hunnefeld:sandraperez@miamibeachtl.gov •Henry J Hunnefeld:merarimotola@miamibeachfl.gov •Freddi R.Mack:freddimack@miamibeachfl.gov •Benjamin Braun:benjaminbraun@miamibeachtl.gov •Carla Pompa: •Carla Pompa:carlapompa@miamibeachtl.gov •Casey Chu:caseychu@miamibeachtl.gov •Jaisel Cordoba:jcordoba@jud11.tlcourts.org •Meghan E.Rovner:meghan@orlofskylawfirm.com •Meghan E.Rovner:alex@orlofskylawfirm.com Case No:2025-047140-SP-24 Page 8 of 8